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 1 
Introduction 
 My first contact with the Wabash River came at the age of 5 when Peru, Indiana 
experienced a flood.  The lesson I learned was that the dividing line between my home 
and the river was imaginary.  The flood of 1959 was average at best, but in the eyes of a 
five year old boy who lived only a block away from the river, average was not a word 
that computed.  I had gone to bed the night before secure in the knowledge that my world 
was safe.  I awoke the next morning to an altered landscape that included a new 
swimming pool where my back yard had been just a day before.  My initial excitement 
over the new addition to our yard was soon tempered as my mother led me onto the stoop 
outside our kitchen door.  From there I could see the river.  It bore no resemblance to the 
river I knew.  The lazy, chocolate colored ribbon had changed into a raging, debris filled 
monster.  The banks that normally contained the river had disappeared.  The railroad 
yards that defined Peru’s economic heart ran alongside the river, but they had also 
vanished.  There were no switch engines or box cars, no men with oily rags, none of the 
everyday noises that normally accompanied my bacon and eggs each morning.  There 
was only the hiss of the water as it churned up my world.  It was an entirely new concept 
for me; the river was out of control!  I turned to my mother, who was still standing there 
holding my hand, and said “this was a dumb place to put a house.”  It was a revelation 
that introduced me to the lessons the Wabash River taught in what songwriter Paul 
Dresser called “nature’s school.”1  
 What historical lessons does the Wabash River reveal in “nature’s school?”  The 
relationship between people and water is part of the larger question of how people and 
                                                          
1 Paul Dresser, On the Banks of the Wabash, Far Away (New York: Howley, Haviland and Co., 1897). 
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the natural landscape around them are connected as well as the historical consequences of 
that interaction.  Historians like Marc Reisner, Richard White, Mark Fiege, and Ari 
Kelman address the tie between water and Americans because it is a historical connection 
as tempestuous as any human relationship.  While there have been copious volumes about 
environmental history in the western United States, there are fewer works on the 
landscape created by the interaction of humans and water on a smaller scale, yet there are 
important historical lessons to be learned there also.   
 Smaller rivers like the Wabash have been overlooked in large part because they 
lack the “vastness” that many people still associate with the word nature. William Cronon 
argues that if we put wilderness on a pedestal, we may develop a mindset that diminishes 
the historical value of places, people, and events that are “less natural.”2  Cronon’s essay, 
“The Trouble with Wilderness or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” makes the point 
that the accepted way of looking at nature tends to give higher status to some places 
while diminishing the importance of others.  Yet, for every Yosemite or Yellowstone, 
there are multiple Upper Wabash Valleys and Mississinewa Rivers.  Which of these is 
more important to a fundamental understanding of the link between people and nature?  
Is a mountain more important than a swamp, a forest more vital than a park?  People tend 
to think that nature has to be big and separate from people.  This is a faulty concept that 
denies much of what surrounds us as being natural and thus limits our vision as 
historians. 
 The faulty notion that humanity and nature are separate prevents us from seeing a 
tree in the forest and a tree planted along a suburban street as being equal in the natural 
                                                          
2 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” Environmental 
History 1, no. 1, (1996): 20. 
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world.  Historian Elliot West has said that a frontier never separates things, it brings them 
together.3  He is right and nature acts the same way.  We sometimes can’t see the forest 
for the trees or, for that matter, the river for the water.  Historians have begun to write 
with the intention of showing how the relationship between rivers and people can expand 
our definition of what is “natural.”   The biggest lesson is that separating humans from 
nature is both difficult and inappropriate.  Water and people are part of the same 
environment.    
 Ari Kelman, speaking of the link between New Orleans and the Mississippi River, 
made the point that the relationship between a river and a city is reciprocal; they act on 
each other.4  Attempting to draw a line between manmade space and the natural 
environment may, at times, be an exercise in futility.  Human desire to make water an 
orderly thing dispensed from a faucet denies the true relationship between nature and 
man because nature has a way of bypassing the faucet.  Chapter 3 of Kelman’s book, A 
River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in New Orleans describes the interaction 
between the Mississippi River and the people of New Orleans and stresses the correlation 
between human and natural landscape.  During the yellow fever epidemic of 1853, which 
devastated the city, local leaders realized that control of the waterfront did not translate 
into control of the Mississippi River ecosystem.  No amount of political power could 
drain the swamp or create the cooler temperatures necessary to control the disease.  The 
people of New Orleans thought they controlled nature, but the line between New Orleans 
                                                          
3 Elliot West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998), 13. 
4 Ari Kelman, A River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in New Orleans (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 8-9. 
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and the environment was imaginary.  Thousands of people died and the epidemic did not 
subside until the frosts of autumn ended it.   
  Other environmental historians like Mark Fiege and Richard White analyze the 
Snake and the Columbia rivers to show how landscape consists of an inseparable mix of 
both people and nature.  The use of water from these rivers for irrigation, drainage, and 
electrical power illustrates the intertwining of humans and nature into what Richard 
White calls an organic machine.  He cites the damming of the Columbia as an example of 
human attempts to make the river do “work other than its own,” thus giving human 
beings an opportunity to live and work differently.5  Writing about people and the river 
separately would be like “writing a biography of a wife, placing it alongside the 
biography of a husband and calling it the history of a marriage.”6   
 Mark Fiege’s book Irrigated Eden argues that no matter what we do to nature, it 
always responds.  There are often unexpected consequences when humans attempt to 
alter nature. Irrigated Eden uses the irrigation system of southern Idaho and the Snake 
River to show how manmade “improvements” to natural environments form landscapes 
that are a little bit of both.  Fiege uses the example of Lateral L, a manmade irrigation 
ditch that ended up looking natural.7  The line between manmade and natural was blurred 
to the point that it was no longer relevant.  Fiege contends that no matter how hard people 
try to change the landscape, nature has a way of altering the new environment, often in 
ways that make it even stronger than before.8  Moss infiltrated irrigation ditches, an 
abundance of new vegetation led to rabbit infestations, and water seepage poisoned the 
                                                          
5 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1995), 59. 
6 Ibid., x. 
7 Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1999), 5-6. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
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land with salt.  For every move the hydraulic engineers made, nature answered, leading 
Fiege to say that “the boundary between what the irrigators considered artificial and 
natural, domesticated and wild, grew hazy, indistinct, and sometimes disappeared 
altogether.”9  This echoes Kelman’s Mississippi and White’s Columbia.  There is much 
to learn about our place in nature from the historical relationship between rivers and 
people.  No matter how preeminent human technology seems to be, nature always fights 
back, creating an unintended landscape and opening new avenues for historical research.  
As William Cronon said, “…landscape is more than just a physical set of things, because 
those things are always entangled in webs of meaning that, often as not, take the form of 
myth.  A landscape, in sum, is not just a place, it is a story.”10  
 The story I want to address in this thesis is the one between the Wabash River and 
the city of Peru, Indiana.  Ever since the day the Wabash intruded into my world, I 
wondered why Peru was situated in such a vulnerable location.  Not only was the town 
astride the Wabash River, it was less than a mile downstream from the fork of the 
Wabash and Mississinewa rivers.  As I got older and learned more about the history of 
the area, I wondered why so much of the legacy of the Wabash was ignored.  The 
Wabash & Erie Canal played a large role in the history of the town, but the significance 
of both the canal and the river to local history had all but disappeared.  All we ever heard 
about was the circus history of the town.  Locals also ignored the importance of the 1913 
flood, probably the most significant historical event in the town’s history.  If not for a 
tiny 4 x 6 inch plaque marking the high water mark on a building at the corner of Sixth 
Street and Broadway, I would never have known the flood happened.  Why was the town 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 78. 
10 Cronon, “The Trouble With Wilderness,” 9. 
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built where floods could destroy it?  Where exactly was the line between the river and the 
town?  How important was the 1913 flood?  Why would the town ignore this aspect of its 
past? 
 I found no good answers to any of these questions until I learned about the field of 
environmental history.  The history of Peru is intertwined with the Wabash River but I 
never found a way to understand the relationship solely from the traditional perspectives 
of economic, political, and cultural history.  Three previous volumes written by Arthur 
Bodurtha, Charles Stephens, and Brant and Fuller provide written histories of Peru that 
address the past from one or more of these traditional viewpoints, but none of them gave 
satisfactory answers to my questions.  It was only after I read the works of Cronon, 
White, Fiege, and others that I began to see a way to understand some of the reasons why 
the history of Peru unfolded as it did.  Peru was established as a result of the construction 
of the Wabash and Erie Canal.  The resulting landscape that evolved was not one where 
humans and nature were separated, but a complex one in which nature constantly 
reasserted itself in a manmade environment.  The result of my research is this thesis, 
which attempts to show the different ways in which the people of Peru saw the Wabash 
River, how faulty interpretations of their relationship to it resulted in unintended changes 
to the landscape, and how the 1913 flood was the ultimate consequence of those changes.  
People living along the Wabash in the 1800s understood the river in many different ways 
and altered it accordingly.  Their efforts produced unintended consequences, leading 
ultimately to the economic disaster caused by the 1913 flood. 
 Chapter 1 addresses the interpretations of the landscape of the upper Wabash 
Valley of both Native Americans and white settlers.  The original Native American 
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societies that inhabited the region integrated their cultures with the ebb and flow of the 
environment, but the introduction of white immigrants driven by the economic potential 
of the Wabash River fueled dramatic changes in how the river and surrounding landscape 
were perceived as they sought to control the power of the river.  That desire led to the 
founding of Peru in a vulnerable location just below the confluence of the Wabash and 
Mississinewa rivers.  Chapter 2 explains how perception and reality in the Upper Wabash 
Valley were not always compatible.  Human technology, represented by the Wabash and 
Erie Canal, seemed to separate what was natural from what was manmade, but the line 
between the two often blurred when nature interfered in the form of flood, drought, and 
the encroachment of animals and vegetation that caused major problems for the operators 
of the canal and the towns along its path.  The canal also introduced thousands of 
immigrants to the area.  They cleared trees, dug ditches, and introduced tiling systems 
that altered the landscape and caused the Wabash River to react in unintended ways.  
Chapter 3 addresses the consequences of the changes introduced along the Upper Wabash 
Valley and how the 1913 flood finally forced the people of Peru to address the 
misperceptions about the place of the town in the natural landscape.  
 The conclusion I reach matches that of many other environmental writers.  It is 
impossible to separate what is manmade from what is natural without consequences.  The 
landscape created along the Upper Wabash Valley when the first Americans arrived with 
their shovels and plows contained elements of both.  Even as the human interpretation of 
who controlled the landscape evolved, the river responded to human changes in the 
landscape in ways both unanticipated and uncontrollable by the people of Peru.  They 
assumed that they were in control, which led them to take the river for granted.  As a 
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result, when the Wabash rose up, the town of Peru paid the price.  The outcome is an 
explanation that sheds some new light on how, where, and why the city of Peru, Indiana, 
developed the way it did as well as explain why nature is not only defined by a lack of 
human presence in the landscape, but is a consequence of the marriage between the two.  
My house on Second Street was not a “dumb” place for a home.  On the contrary, it was 
perfectly natural.  
 9  
Chapter 1:  Early Perceptions of the Upper Wabash Landscape 
 The early history of the Upper Wabash Valley and the story of how the city of 
Peru was founded show how the conventional Native American understanding of the 
landscape along the Wabash River underwent dramatic change in the early 1800s as 
American settlers began to move into the area, bringing a new perception of the Wabash 
River.  While the original inhabitants of the land saw the river as a source of life and the 
center of much of their culture, white immigrants saw the river as a source of energy 
capable of driving an economic engine that could harness the resources of the Upper 
Wabash Valley.  This change in perception is illustrated in the political and economic 
machinations that led to the founding of Peru, Indiana.  
 Three major groups have inhabited the area where Peru, the seat of Miami 
County, now stands.  The prehistoric mound builders were the first inhabitants of the 
Miami County area and deserve a place in the narrative because what little evidence we 
have of them points to a close relationship to the river.  The next people to arrive were 
Native Americans of the mid 17th century, the Miami Nation in particular.  It is important 
to understand their relationship with the Wabash River because it was so different from 
the view of the third group to settle in the area, white settlers, who dramatically altered 
the perception of the river and how the local landscape was used.  Each of these groups 
understood the river differently, illustrating the varying ways in which the landscape of 
the Upper Wabash Valley was interpreted by the people who lived there.   
 The first inhabitants of the area where Peru now sits left no written record, but 
relied heavily on the river to sustain their culture and almost certainly influenced the 
belief system of the Native Americans who followed them.  We do not know much about 
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them except that they were prolific mound builders, hence their name.  Archeological 
evidence supports the argument that their culture depended on the Wabash River and that 
they populated the area around present-day Peru.11  Experts do not consider them Native 
Americans, but rather a prehistoric society that came and went long before the 
introduction of the known Indian tribes to the region.  Prof. Frank M. Setzler in his report 
The Archaeology of the Whitewater Valley says:  “we gain the impression that a gap of 
more than a century must have existed between the time of the pre-historic tribes and the 
invading historic tribes.  The connecting link between historic and pre-historic man - the 
builder of the mounds - in Indiana is missing.”12  An 1888 report by the Indiana State 
Geologist stated that the first inhabitants of Miami County “left but few monuments to 
perpetuate their memory.  Occasional mounds are about the only earthworks and… the 
greater part of them are in the southern part of the county.”13     
 Evidence of their existence around Peru also remains in the stone tools and 
weapons they left behind.  A large proportion of these artifacts have been found along the 
Wabash and Mississinewa rivers, lending credence to the idea that these prehistoric 
inhabitants relied heavily on those rivers to sustain their culture.14  When the Miami 
Nation moved into the area, they reused arrowheads, spearheads, and other implements 
that they found.  Although there is no ironclad evidence of a link between the two 
societies, it is probable that the later Native American societies inherited some of the 
Mound Builder’s cultural focus on the Wabash River as well as their tools.   
                                                          
11 Arthur L. Bodurtha, History of Miami County: A Narrative Account of Its Historical Progress, Its 
People, and Its Principal Interests Vol. 1 (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1914), 19. 
12 Frank M. Setzler, The Archaeology of the Whitewater Valley (Indianapolis: Historical Bureau of the 
Indiana Library and Historical Dept., 1930), 43. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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 The first societies in the region for which a historical record exists are Native 
American.  The most conspicuous tribe in the historical record of the Peru area is the 
Miami Nation, a people who moved into the vicinity of modern day Peru in the late 
1600s.  They were an agricultural society.  A French account from 1718 noted the 
industrious nature of the tribe and commented that they raised “a kind of Indian corn 
which is unlike that of our tribes at Detroit.”15  The demands of a primarily agrarian 
culture made the Indians dependent on water and the Miami tended to settle near streams 
and rivers where the rich soil promoted a wide variety of plant life, making it easier to 
grow the crops on which they depended and catch the fish and wildlife that supplemented 
their diet.  They were experts at growing numerous varieties of corn, along with melons, 
squashes, pumpkins, and gourds.16  While hunting and fishing played a role in the 
everyday lives of the Miami, the predominantly agricultural nature of their culture led to 
the establishment of large, semi permanent villages within the territories they controlled.  
Invariably, these settlements were near rivers.  Before the mid 17th century, the tribe 
(actually a loose association of six sub-tribes) was concentrated mostly across northern 
Indiana and Ohio.  A war with the Iroquois pushed them into northern Illinois and 
Wisconsin during the 1650s, but by 1680, the Miami returned to Indiana, settling along 
the upper Wabash Valley where they spent the better part of the next 100 years.17  They 
called the river the “Wah-Bah Shik-Ki”, meaning “pure white.”18  This was in reference 
to the way the sun gleamed off the pristine limestone bed of the river in the days before 
                                                          
 15 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 
1904-1907), 375. 
16 Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Society Press, 1996), 12. 
17 Ibid., 27. 
18 Arthur C. Benke, Colbert E. Cushing, Rivers of North America: The Natural History (Burlington, MA.  
Academic Press, 2005), 396. 
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agricultural runoff turned it into the chocolate brown ribbon that cuts through Indiana 
today.19  It was also a term of respect for the river. 
 Rivers were an important component in the creation beliefs of the tribe, 
symbolizing the bond the Miami had with their environment.  According to their creation 
beliefs, the Miami came forth from a pool of water known as Sakiwayungi, or the 
“Coming Out Place.”  The tribal name for the St. Joseph River at South Bend was 
Sakiwasipiwi, or “Coming Out River.” It was there that they believed the first Miami 
emerged and established the first village.20  In other words, the Miami believed they were 
born from the waters they used each day.  Not only did the river provide the rich 
bottomland needed for agriculture and a source for food and transportation, it was 
endowed with a spiritual and cultural significance which transcended day to day uses.  
 Daily use of the river was a fundamental part of the Miami belief system.  Richard 
White argues that, “the energy of the Columbia River was felt in human bones and 
sinews; human beings knew the river through the work the river demanded of them.”21   It 
was the same for the Miami.  The river was integral to their daily lives.  One story in 
particular illustrates this relationship.  There is a large rock in the middle of the Wabash 
River a few miles east of Peru at a spot that used to be known as Boyd’s Park (See Figure 
1).  The rock has a dished-in spot on the top of it that holds about three gallons of water.  
According to Chief Clarence Godfroy of the Miami, there was once a large Indian village 
there and the Indians used the rock as a grist-mill.  “Indian corn was put into the 
                                                          
19 French explorers to the area later corrupted the word to “Ouabache” and eventually the word became 
“Wabash.” 
 20 Ibid., 15. 
21 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1995), 4. 
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hollowed out space…It was pounded into corn meal.  Many meals were prepared for the 
Indians from the corn meal pounded on this rock.”22   
 
The tribe used this rock on a regular basis, literally standing in the water to pound the 
corn.  The river and its landscape were part of their daily routine.  They knew the river by 
their work and depended on it for both spiritual and temporal needs. 
 The tribal view of the river was in direct contrast to that of the Americans.  The 
Miami felt intertwined with the landscape.  White settlers in the area saw the river in a 
more detached manner.  To them, the river was a power source for technology, not a 
source of cultural strength.  One needs look no further than the name of the rock used by 
the Miami.  To the Indians it was “grist-mill rock,” a place in the river from which they 
provided nourishment by working with what nature provided.  Whites in the area knew it 
                                                          
22 Chief Clarence Godfroy, Miami Indian Stories (Winona Lake, Indiana: Light and Life Press, 1961), 4-5. 
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simply as “dish pan rock,” for they could see no other use for a rock in the middle of the 
river.  If a white man wanted a grist-mill, he took the water from the river to power a 
machine that would make corn meal.  The water was his to use because he could change 
the river and control it.  The Indians felt the power of the river in the daily work they did 
and respected their closeness to it.  The settlers relied on technology to manipulate that 
same power, which distanced them from the river.   
 Native Americans did not understand the white American’s view of the landscape.  
They shared the same philosophy with the Sac chief Black Hawk who, in 1832, mocked a 
treaty with the Americans by enunciating his cultural belief that land could never be sold 
by the Indians because “their lives and the land’s were one.”23   He derided the American 
tendency to divide and order land into neat parcels to be bought and sold by stating that 
“Nothing can be sold but such things as can be carried away.”24  Unfortunately, for both 
Black Hawk and the Miami of Indiana, the Americans did not share the same viewpoint. 
By the 1820s, American desire for economic growth altered the river’s place in the 
landscape as well as the position of Native American peoples along the Upper Wabash 
Valley.  
 The topography of the Upper Wabash Valley made the territory along the Wabash 
River irresistible to pioneers looking to expand the economic base of the new country.  
By the early 1800s, white settlers had moved across the Appalachian Mountains and into 
what is now Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and southern Indiana.  Environmental historian 
Donald J. Pisani explains that the lack of roads made rivers like the Wabash an integral 
part of westward expansion: “rivers offered cheaper and more dependable transportation.  
                                                          
23 William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1991), 27. 
24 Ibid. 
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The geology of the area reinforced the American proclivity to gobble up land.  The best 
farmland bordered streams and many rivers produced a relatively flat alluvial plain that… 
lent itself to the construction of towns.”25  Contact between humans and the river became 
more complicated with the arrival of farmers, merchants, and engineers who saw the 
Wabash as a God-given hydrological highway, flowing for their economic use.  The 
indigenous spiritual perception of the landscape was replaced by a new one based on the 
American spiritual belief that westward expansion was ordained by God, who provided 
natural resources as a means to that end.   
 Early U.S. leaders such as George Washington viewed rivers as economic 
landscapes and saw canals as an answer to the transportation woes of a fledgling United 
States.  In particular, Washington saw the Wabash River as a way to connect the Great 
Lakes to the Mississippi River, opening vast tracts of land in the Northwest Territories to 
settlement and trade.  Washington broached this idea in 1784 when he asked Congress to 
pursue the exploration of rivers “as far west as the miamies, running into the Ohio and 
Lake Erie… to see how the waters of these communicate with the River St. Joseph… and 
the Wabash.”26  By 1824, the Indiana legislature had funded the first surveys of a 
proposed canal along the Wabash River and the federal government pushed the plan 
forward in 1827 by granting 527,271 acres of land stretched over 160 miles of river to the 
new state of  Indiana.  The sale of that land would finance the building of the canal and 
provide the stimulus for economic expansion along the river corridor.27  The federal 
                                                          
25 Donald J. Pisani, "Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: Nationalizing the History of Water in the United 
States," Environmental History 5, no. 4 (2000): 468. 
26 Paul Fatout, Indiana Canals (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1972), 23. 
27 Thomas E. Castaldi, Wabash & Erie Canal Notebook I: Allen and Huntington Counties, 2nd ed. (Fort 
Wayne, Indiana: Parrot Printing, Inc., 2002), 2. 
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government was able to offer the land to Indiana because of a series of treaties made with 
the Miami, Potawatomi, and other tribes who lived along the Wabash River corridor.   
 The road to those treaties had not been an easy one.  The Indians had maintained 
parity in power with the French and British who first came to the western frontier.  When 
warfare erupted, as often as not it was Native Americans who were victorious.  It was not 
until the Indian defeat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 that the negotiations began 
which resulted in the loss of most of the Indian land along the Wabash River by the end 
of 1826.  Those negotiations quickly eroded the Miami culture.  
 After the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 evicted them from their villages in 
northeast Indiana, many of the Miami Indians relocated to small villages along the 
Wabash, Mississinewa, and Eel rivers in or near what is now known as Miami County.  
They believed that they could live along the Wabash as long as they desired, but the 
move dispersed most of the tribe into smaller villages where they were separated from the 
trade center of Fort Wayne where they could easily trade for the goods they needed.28  
Article V of the Greenville Treaty also stipulated that if the tribe was “disposed to sell 
their lands, or any part of them, they were to be sold only to the United States.”29  This 
gave the U.S. government leverage in future negotiations with the tribe. 
 By 1800, American pressure in the newly created Indiana Territory began to 
erode the traditional Miami perception and use of the landscape.  A further series of 
treaties interspersed with military defeats along the Wabash and Mississinewa rivers in 
1811 and 1812 left the Miami Nation weakened and isolated both physically and 
culturally.  By the time Indiana became a state in 1816, the other tribes in the region, with 
                                                          
28 Rafert, The Miami Indians, 63. 
29 Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1962), 42. 
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the exception of the Potawatomi, had sold or abandoned their land.  This left the Miami 
Indian land along the Wabash encircled by Americans and well behind the new western 
border of the frontier.  It also made their land a target for acquisition by whites as the 
burgeoning American economic system began to transform the landscape with new 
methods of transportation inspired by the internal improvements boom.  As Miami 
historian Stewart Rafert explains: “the Miami tribe occupied some of the most valuable 
potential commercial sites in the state, astride proposed canal and highway routes and at 
the location of future towns and cities.”30  The National Road, the Erie Canal, and other 
projects aided westward expansion and made the eastward movement of agricultural and 
manufactured goods from the western frontier easier.  It was only a matter of time before 
the economic development of northern Indiana began.   
 Statehood was achieved in 1816, and erosion of tribal life advanced as the Miami 
were maneuvered into a subsistence lifestyle on steadily diminishing land holdings.  New 
American residents flooded Indiana, sweeping up land and redefining the landscape along 
the Wabash through treaties with the Native American inhabitants.  Between the years of 
1800-1816, the white population of the territory grew from about 2, 500 to almost 
70,000.31  By 1820, the number more than doubled to 147,178.32  The rapid influx of 
settlers put massive pressure on the Miami way of life.  While the tribe had spent the 
better part of the previous 200 years immersed in a patchwork society that involved trade 
with French, British, and Americans, they had achieved a cultural equilibrium with 
western Europeans that enabled them to survive in the natural landscape.  They hunted, 
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fished, and grew crops up and down the Upper Wabash Valley while maintaining a belief 
system that had changed little over the years.  A series of treaties, culminating in The 
Treaty of St. Mary’s, Ohio in October of 1818, chipped away at the traditional Miami 
society.  Substantial annuities were offered by the federal government in return for Miami 
land, creating a new Native American economy that was dependent on the U.S. 
government as well as fracturing what remained of Miami landholdings into six small 
village reserves and twenty-four individual reserves.33  By 1820, traditional Miami 
society was substantially weakened. 
 The loss of most of their land, coupled with the introduction of a new economy 
severely disrupted the Miami culture, altering their perception of the landscape.  Instead 
of a trading system based on the furs and hides taken from the river valley, the Miami 
developed a dependence on the goods and services offered by the American traders.  
These businessmen poured into the area around Fort Wayne with the intention of 
obtaining annuity money given to the Indians by the federal government as part of 
various treaty negotiations.34  The loss of so much of their land “separated the Miami 
from their hunting territories, fishing weirs…, and made other subsistence activities more 
difficult.”35  Government officials, white traders, and land speculators intent on 
reordering the river to fit a new purpose put great pressure on the Miami, causing the 
tribe to rethink their place in the landscape of the Upper Wabash Valley.  By 1826, it was 
apparent that Chief Blackhawk was wrong.  Indians could sell their land. 
 The fact that the leader of the Miami at this critical juncture in their history was 
half white reflects the evolution of Miami culture and their changing position within the 
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landscape.  The principal chief was Jean Baptiste Richardville, successor to Chief Little 
Turtle in 1815.36  Richardville’s father was a French trader and his mother was the 
daughter of Little Turtle.  He was raised as a Miami, and knew their culture intimately, 
but had one foot in the white world also.  He developed a keen business sense from the 
American traders around him and “grew into an intelligent, shrewd man, wise in the ways 
of the white man’s politics.”37  Richardville was a savvy businessman and ran one of the 
largest trading posts at Fort Wayne in 1790.  It was a place where Miami and American 
culture and landscape overlapped.  Settlers built the original fort there because it was the 
location of Kekionga, the largest of the Miami villages.  It was also the place where the 
St. Mary’s River converged with the St. Joseph River to form the Maumee.  The fledgling 
commerce center was both a transportation and financial hub for the area because the 
U.S. government disbursed annuity payments there.  Richardville had stiff business 
competition in the form of white traders who were intent on bilking the Indians of their 
money and land.  Henry Hay visited Fort Wayne that year and he observed: “everyone 
tries to get what he can by fowle [sic] play or otherwise…in short I cannot term it in a 
better manner than calling it a Rascally Scrambling Trade.”38  Richardville managed to 
survive and prosper there.   
 He also understood the value of money and land ownership in a way most 
members of his tribe could not.  Arthur Bodurtha, one of the original historians in Miami 
County had this to say of Richardville: “His Indian name was Pe-she-wa (the lynx), a 
name indicative of his character -- always alert and watchful for his own interests and the 
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welfare of his tribe.”39  The 875,000 acres the tribe owned in 1820 spread across some of 
the most valuable land in the state.  Richardville’s knowledge of the American real estate 
system plus his trading expertise helped to make him an effective diplomat in treaty talks 
with the U.S. government.  General John Tipton, who was one of the federal negotiators 
for the Paradise Spring Treaty and a well known trader and land speculator in his own 
right, called Richardville “the ablest diplomat of whom I have any knowledge.”40   
 By 1815, when Richardville became chief, he had already been a witness to the 
removal of other tribes from their lands, whether by treaty or force.41  He knew the value 
of the land and realized that, one way or another, the tribe was going to lose it.  
Consequently, he used his skills as a negotiator to sell the Miami lands that remained 
along the Upper Wabash Valley to the Americans in exchange for large monetary 
concessions.42  Much of the money went to the tribe, but a large portion of it was 
awarded to Richardville and his family as an incentive to convince the Miami to vacate 
the land.  He also received guarantees from the federal government that he would never 
have to leave his landholdings in Indiana.  When Richardville died in 1841, his personal 
wealth was over $1,000,000, making him the richest Native American in the United 
States at the time.  He owned vast tracts of land, numerous houses, and was rumored to 
have buried over $200,000 in coin on his various properties.43   
 Richardville inherited a very difficult position as leader of the Miami Nation and 
his consequent actions reflect the changing perspective of the landscape the members of 
the tribe were experiencing.  He oversaw the treaty negotiations and land sales that 
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marked the time when the Miami came to relate to the river and its landscape in the same 
way as the whites, as property to be bought and sold.  It is hard not to be critical of 
Richardville for selling Indian land at personal gain, but it is difficult to assign only one 
motive to his actions.  Richardville is sometimes called the “Man in the Middle.”44  Was 
he simply a greedy man who took advantage of his position to get rich or was he a man 
who saw his native way of life dying and tried to help his people to the best of his 
ability?45  It is a question difficult to answer, but there is no doubt that he presided over a 
time of great change within the Native American community along the upper Wabash 
Valley.  While the mindset of previous Miami leaders would have made them balk at 
selling the grist-mill rock, Richardville knew enough of Americans to realize that the 
world of the Miami was changing with or without their consent.  He sold the rock for as 
much money as possible and hoped his people could adapt and buy their corn meal like 
the Americans did.  When the Miami signed the Treaty of Paradise Springs with the U.S. 
government on October 23, 1826, the Wabash River Valley changed from the focal point 
of their culture into a commodity within the economic landscape being created by the 
new owners of the land.   
 The Treaty of Paradise Springs removed the last roadblock to the economic 
exploitation of the Wabash River Valley.  The treaty called for the Miami Indians to give 
up most of their remaining land along the Wabash River and provided a right of way for 
the building of a canal across the few parcels that were left.  In return, the tribe received 
over $31,000 in money and trade items (almost $750,000 in today’s dollars) as well as a 
future payment of $41,259 in goods.  The federal government also increased their yearly 
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annuity to $25,000 and gave various chiefs money, cattle, homes, and sections of land.46  
Miami historian Stewart Rafert explains: “In the face of mounds of finery, offers of 
houses and private lands for the chiefs, and the flow of mind-dissolving hard liquor, the 
Miami relented and signed the treaty.”47  Richardville was the prime beneficiary of this 
largesse, receiving a home, trading concessions, and several sections of land (including 
the present site of Peru).  Another Miami chief, Francis Godfroy, also received a section 
of ground directly east of Richardville’s.   
 When the articles of this treaty went into effect, the Miami Nation’s role within 
the Wabash Valley changed because the Americans redefined the purpose of the river and 
its surrounding landscape.  The Wabash was transformed by American plans of turning it 
into an economic engine for the region. Grist-mill rock was now dish-pan rock.  The 
traditional Native American interaction with the river slowly disappeared.  The Miami 
remained in isolated pockets, but their main role in the new economic landscape was as a 
magnet for white traders attracted by Indian annuity money. 
 The Paradise Springs Treaty marked a changing of the guard as far as the river 
was concerned.  The Americans were now free to begin economic expansion all along the 
new corridor.  The treaty opened a figurative floodgate as land speculators, traders, and 
businessmen moved into the newly acquired territory.  The river was no longer seen by 
local inhabitants as a part of the natural landscape.  It was a new source of wealth, there 
to provide transportation and power that would fuel a new economy and bring major 
fortunes to businessmen who were lucky enough or farsighted enough to take advantage 
of it. 
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 By the early 1820s, the main congregating point for business entrepreneurs was 
the trading center for the Upper Wabash Valley, Fort Wayne.  The dispensing of federal 
annuity money there drew these men to Fort Wayne like flies to honey.  There were no 
other towns at all along the upper Wabash River at this time, just a few Indian villages.  
One of the first Protestant missionaries to the area described Fort Wayne in 1820 as: “a 
little village of traders and persons employed by the government as interpreters, smiths, 
etc. …the nearest settlement of white people was… nearly one hundred miles distant.”48  
Captain James Riley, an engineer evaluating the feasibility of a canal from the Maumee 
to the Wabash, provided a more colorful description of annuity payment time at Fort 
Wayne in 1820.  His description illustrates the collision of Native American and white 
culture:   
There were at least one thousand whites here from Ohio, Michigan, New 
York, and Indiana, trading with the Indians.  They brought a great 
abundance of whiskey with them, which they dealt out to the Indians 
freely, in order to keep them continually drunk and unfit for business; their 
purpose being to get the best of them in trade.”  Horse-racing, gambling, 
drinking, and debauchery, extravagance, and waste were the order of the 
day and night.49    
 
The furious activity by traders and land speculators alike to relieve the Indians of their 
wealth and extend them enough credit to be able to confiscate their land when payments 
were due created a new economic landscape along the Wabash River. 
 Among the people flocking to Fort Wayne to make their fortunes were Joseph 
Holman and William Hood, the two men who would soon found Peru.  The Hood family 
arrived from Dayton, Ohio, in 1822, and in early 1823 Joseph Holman was sent by 
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President Monroe to be the first receiver at the Federal Land Office in Fort Wayne.50  
Both men were experienced in business and politics.  With the sale of Indian land and the 
possibility of a new canal along the Wabash River as incentives, they moved to Fort 
Wayne to take advantage of economic and political conditions that converged there.  
They brought with them American ideas about the place of rivers within the new 
landscape.  Before 1824, most whites recognized that most of the wealth gleaned from 
the region was in the form of pelts and furs brought in for trade there, making the 
economic system dependent on the traditional environment along the rivers in the area.  
By 1824, traders found it far more profitable to trade for the annuity money the Indians 
received than to depend on the supply of furs.  Land itself became the most valuable 
commodity as speculators moved in and the time was right to transform the Upper 
Wabash Valley from “part of the frontier into a product of it.”51   
 The Ewing family used trading experience and political connections to create 
opportunity and wealth along the Upper Wabash Valley.  Colonel Alexander Ewing, his 
wife, four sons, and three daughters came to Fort Wayne in 1822.  They quickly became 
an integral part of the political and economic fabric of the town.  Ewing achieved his rank 
serving with General Harrison during the War of 1812.  He was an Indian trader from at 
least 1787 and established a tavern, hotel, and trading post in Fort Wayne.  According to 
Fort Wayne historian Bert Griswold, he acquired “real estate which is today of 
incalculable value.”52  Two of his sons, George W. and William G., were also well 
established traders.  Historian Stewart Rafert documented their relationship with the 
Miami Indians.  He stressed their importance to the history of the area because of the 
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influence they had with General John Tipton, the man who became the Indian Agent in 
Fort Wayne in 1823.  Tipton was a good man to be close to because he controlled trading 
licenses and treaty negotiations.53  The Ewings fostered the relationship with Tipton 
because it allowed them to use federal Indian policy for their own gain. Rafert points out 
that by the time the Ewings arrived in Fort Wayne, “they had thirty-five years experience 
in the Indian trade, which meant intimate knowledge of, but not necessarily respect for, 
the ways of the Indians.”54  When Allen County was established in 1824, the first 
commissioner’s meetings were held at Ewing’s tavern; the Ewing home was the first 
meeting place for the circuit court; and Alexander was elected as one of three justices of 
the peace.55  Charles W. became the first county prosecuting attorney and his brother 
William became a lawyer. Alexander Ewing also purchased an additional eighty acres of 
prime real estate from the government in what would become downtown Fort Wayne for 
the sum of $100.56  When Tipton resigned as Indian Agent in September, Charles W. 
Ewing was named by Congress as his replacement. The Ewings were involved in 
virtually every aspect of the political and economic system on the Upper Wabash and 
provided a business model for other entrepreneurs coming to Fort Wayne.  They were 
influential in local and state politics for years to come. 
 One of the entrepreneurs who found his way to Fort Wayne was William Nesbitt 
Hood, a thirty-two year old merchant and trader from Dayton, Ohio.  Information about 
his early life is rather scarce, but the rapidity with which he rose in Fort Wayne social and 
political circles implies that he came to the city as an established businessman with an 
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aptitude for frontier society.  An early history of Peru states that after his arrival in 
Indiana: “he carried on a successful mercantile business, dealing extensively with the 
Indians during the time of his residence there [Fort Wayne].” 57  A Miami County history 
contends that Hood amassed a sizable fortune during his stay at Fort Wayne, which lends 
credence to the notion that he was an astute Indian trader.58  Hood quickly became 
involved in Fort Wayne politics and the purchase of land.  In the first Board of 
Commissioners meeting held at Alexander Ewings house in May of 1824, Hood was 
appointed by the same body as inspector of flour, beef, and pork for Wayne Township.  
He also served with Alexander Ewing on the first grand jury called in August of 1824 and 
became a justice of the peace alongside Ewing.59  In September, Hood also bought a 
prime lot in Fort Wayne for a little over $20.00.60  By 1827, he was designated a judge of 
the circuit court of Allen County by the governor of Indiana.  Hood also married 
Charlotte Ewing, the daughter of Alexander Ewing, in 1827.  Whether by accident or 
intention, William Hood developed the connections and the wealth needed to take 
advantage of the events taking place along the Wabash in the mid 1820s. 
 Another businessman who moved to Fort Wayne was Joseph Holman, who had 
been born in Woodford County, Kentucky, on October 1, 1788.  His family moved to 
what is now Wayne County, Indiana, in 1805 and he married there in 1810. He also 
served under General Harrison during the War of 1812 and built a blockhouse on his 
farm at that time for the protection of the local citizenry.61  Joseph also made his living as 
a trader. His father had been a captive among the Indians for many years and was both 
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familiar and friendly with many of the regional tribes.  It wouldn’t be much of a stretch to 
think that the father passed on some of his knowledge of Indian language and customs to 
his son.  Whatever trading skills Joseph possessed, he was soon wealthy and became 
heavily involved in politics.  He was a candidate for the territorial legislature in 1814, but 
lost the election by one vote when he neglected to vote for himself.  His opponent passed 
away before the session started in 1815 and Holman was picked to fill the seat.  He 
participated in the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1816, and served six terms in the 
General Assembly.62   
 Holman apparently found some time to spend at home because he fathered twelve 
children.  Solomon, one of his sons, became an assistant engineer on the Wabash & Erie 
Canal.  In 1823, Joseph Holman went to Fort Wayne as a political appointee by President 
Monroe.  Holman served in the influential position as the first Receiver of the land office 
established there.  He was responsible for the disbursement of Indian annuities.  He 
served in that capacity until 1829, when Andrew Jackson was elected and he lost his 
political post.  During this time, he accumulated real estate holdings and contacts within 
the business and political apparatus of the region that work to his benefit.  Following the 
Ewing family template of controlling business opportunities by becoming deeply 
involved in Fort Wayne politics, Holman also became the first County Treasurer in Allen 
County in 1824.  He was also a land commissioner alongside John Tipton and Alexander 
Ewing in 1825.63  He then served on the Fort Wayne Board of Trustees with William 
Hood.64  By serving in these capacities, Holman gained influence and made important 
contacts in the business community.  He used those contacts wisely.  The 1887 history of 
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Peru also states that Holman “traded extensively in lands and all kinds of real estate…”65  
Holman was successful at amassing a small fortune that gave him economic capital to 
expend as business opportunities became available. 
 Hood and Holman took similar routes to prominence in Fort Wayne by 
maneuvering themselves into positions that allowed them to promote their own interests.  
The political and economic bases they built supported their efforts to exploit the changing 
economic landscape of the Upper Wabash Valley. By the late 1820s, Joseph Holman and 
William Hood were both wealthy men.  They were only waiting for the right opportunity 
to put that wealth to use.   
 Opportunity presented itself in the form of the Wabash & Erie Canal, Indiana’s 
version of a gold rush.  Historian Elliot West wrote of the far western frontier that: 
“waves of new experience rolled… into the continental center and as they did they set 
loose changes that surpassed in speed and scope anything the region had known.”66  That 
is a perfect description of the change occurring along the Wabash River corridor by the 
late 1820s.  Businessmen, engineers, and the fledgling U.S. government saw the land in a 
new light, a reimagining that West called “the perceiving of the country as a 
fundamentally different realm of human use.”67   
 In the case of the Wabash River, the process of reimagining began in earnest on 
March 2, 1827, when the federal government gave Indiana a land grant of 527,271 acres 
along the Wabash River for the intended purpose of financing a new canal along its path.  
Much of this was the Paradise Treaty land negotiated for just the previous October.  The 
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land grant was divided into alternating five section-wide segments along each side of the 
proposed route of the canal.68  The grant stipulated that the canal be commenced within 
five years, completed in twenty, and that it be toll free for use by the Federal 
Government.  The hope was that the sale of this land by Indiana would finance the 
construction of the canal and raise the surrounding land values, a further stimulus to see 
that the canal was completed and that the federal government would recoup its 
investment through land development.69  The land was divided by the Americans into 
neatly partitioned parcels that resembled a chess board where land speculators could 
place wagers.  The Wabash River became a pawn in the new economic landscape.   
 Fort Wayne was ground zero for many of the speculators and canal supporters.  
Joseph Holman and William Hood stood with their feet firmly planted in both camps.  By 
the time the Wabash & Erie Canal became a distinct possibility in 1827, both men had 
amassed great wealth in their dealings with the Indians, both held influential positions in 
the local government, and both had powerful friends.  They were in an excellent position 
to capitalize on what they saw as the virgin territory along the Wabash River.  The two 
men were well acquainted and at least one account of Peru’s history claims they were 
good friends.70    
 In 1827, there was virtually no white presence along the river between Fort 
Wayne and Lafayette.  The river towns of the Upper Wabash Valley were all settled after 
the canal was announced.  Huntington saw its first settlers in 1830, Wabash and Peru in 
1834, Miamisport in 1829, Logansport in 1828, and Delphi in 1835.  The prospect for 
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growth between Fort Wayne, where the canal would tie into Lake Erie via the Maumee 
River, and Lafayette, where the Wabash became deep enough for shipping, was 
enormous.  Those men who moved swiftly to acquire the best real estate along the 
proposed canal route were likely to make a killing.   
 Holman was the first one to try his luck, purchasing 640 acres a little less than 
two miles below the mouth of the Mississinewa River from Chief Richardville on August 
18, 1827 for the sum of $500.71  The section he purchased was one of the tracts given to 
Richardville in the Paradise Springs Treaty just ten months before.  Besides the prospect 
of the canal along the Wabash River, there were state plans to build another canal from 
Indianapolis to the mouth of the Mississinewa River where it would connect with the 
Wabash and Erie Canal.  This prospect made Holman’s site especially valuable. 
Supposedly, Holman didn’t pay the entire amount in cash, but “a thrifty trade was 
worked” in which Richardville received goods as part of the deal, a point noted with 
pride in every early written history of Peru.72  This speaks both to the business acumen of 
Holman as well as his ethics.  He planned a new town named Miamisport on the site. 
 Holman also purchased another section of land from Richardville near the mouth 
of the Eel River, paying $500 for that tract also.73  The president had to approve the deal   
as part of a safety measure to prevent Indians from being cheated out of their land, but the 
system was corrupt because it relied on the judgment of local Indian agents to decide if 
the purchase price was fair or not.  In this case, president John Quincy Adams dealt with 
John Tipton, who recommended approval, which the President gave on March 3, 1828.74  
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Holman immediately sold the Eel River section to General Tipton for $600.75  Tipton was 
working hard to get the Indian Agency moved to the new town of Logansport at that time 
and wanted to gain control of the Miami reserves that remained in the area.76  Tipton and 
Holman were later accused by the competition of defrauding both Richardville and the 
federal government in this transaction and the selling price of only $100 more than 
Holman originally paid does lend some credence to the idea of some kind of collusion 
between the two men, but nothing was ever proven.  The charges were eventually 
dropped by the government after it decided they were politically motivated.   
 Joseph Holman was anxious to get the town of Miamisport platted on his new site 
along the Wabash River.  On March 12, 1829, Holman hired a surveyor who platted the 
town in the southwest corner of Holman’s land.  He included a public square and room 
for a marketplace.  The south side of the new town bordered the Wabash River.  Holman 
wanted to take advantage of the canal to make Miamisport a trade center.77  In line with 
his perception of the land, Holman divided it into neat little parcels, drawing lines that 
gave him control of future economic development of the site.  He built a log cabin along 
the river, but soon moved into a fine stone house on higher ground between Third and 
Main streets.   
 Holman was not the only businessman interested in the area that was soon to be 
designated as Miami County.  William Hood also played an integral part in the economic 
changes taking place along the Wabash.   John H. Stephens history of Peru states that 
Hood was among the first men to make Miamisport their home and lists Holman and 
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Hood both as “the proprietors.”78  While the other two histories of the county do not list 
Hood as one of the town fathers, they do acknowledge that he was among the first men to 
come to Miamisport.  The exact nature of his relationship with Joseph Holman is 
unknown, but the two men were at the very least well acquainted, and at most, friends.  
The truth probably lies somewhere in between.  The two men were at different ends of 
the political spectrum and Hood was part of the political faction that accused General 
Tipton, Holman’s friend, of graft at one point, but they frequented the same business 
circles at Fort Wayne and shared a common background, so it is not unrealistic to think 
that the two men shared a business relationship.  The ensuing conflict between the two 
men exemplifies the new landscape that was taking shape as the perception of the 
Wabash River shifted from the traditional Native American view to that of the new 
American owners.   
 The value of the land was now based on its potential as a commodity, not on its 
value as a home site or as a source of food.  The economic potential of the Wabash & 
Erie Canal made the land Holman bought nothing more than a prospective source of 
revenue no different than a bar of gold or a canoe full of furs.  On January 7, 1829, 
Joseph Holman sold William Hood 210 of the 640 acres along the Wabash River that he 
had purchased just four months before.79  The sale is a perfect example of the land 
speculation that was rampant at the time.  Holman got $500 for the 210 acres.  That was a 
100 percent profit in less than five months and Holman still had two thirds of his land.  
Writing of this deal, historian Frank Fetter estimated that by 1887, the value of the 
original section owned by Richardville had increased to $1,500,000.  Fetter marked the 
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sale to Hood as the beginning of the real estate boom in the area.80  It also marked a 
rapid, permanent shift in the perceived patterns of power and wealth along the path of the 
proposed canal.  Land equaled gold and as Elliot West said about savvy businessmen 
taking advantage of the Colorado gold rush: “Some…rode the changes to success while 
the others slipped into the cultural gloom.”81  That is exactly what happened to Joseph 
Holman and William Hood. 
 Hood made no immediate moves with his purchase and over the next three years, 
Miamisport slowly grew as traders and shopkeepers arrived and settled in to wait for the 
canal, while Hood’s property to the east remained undeveloped.  On February 2, 1832, 
the state legislature passed an act creating Huntington, Wabash, and Miami counties.  The 
state did this in anticipation of the construction of the Wabash & Erie Canal and the flood 
of settlers it would bring to the Upper Wabash Valley.82  This played into the hands of 
Joseph Holman, who wanted Miamisport to be named a county seat, guaranteeing 
financial success for the fledgling community.  The construction of the Wabash & Erie 
Canal also began with groundbreaking ceremonies in Fort Wayne on Washington’s 
Birthday, February 22, 1832.  Jesse Williams was appointed chief civil engineer for the 
project and canal building began in earnest.   
 The legislation that created Huntington, Wabash, and Miami counties neglected to 
set up any specific apparatus for establishing county seats.  By 1834, Indiana had 
appointed a set of commissioners to decide the matter.  Joseph Holman groomed 
Miamisport for this honor, but he underestimated the will of William Hood.  Hood had 
not done much with his 210 acres just east of Miamisport, but by 1834, the prospect of 
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the canal was a reality and Hood decided to lay out a town.  He was prompted to move 
ahead when Holman made an effort to expand Miamisport to the west, enhancing his 
claim for a county seat.  Hood quickly hired Stearns Fisher, an engineer employed on the 
canal, to lay out a new town on his 210 acres.83   Holman was understandably angry at 
Hood, but it is surprising that he didn’t anticipate the move.  Whatever relationship had 
existed between the two men quickly dissolved into a bitter feud.  “Violent words passed 
between them on several occasions and the quarrel became a matter of comment for the 
entire population.”84   The argument between the two men failed to stop Hood, and he 
pushed ahead with the platting of his own town.  The work was done quickly and by the 
time the commissioners met in June of 1834, Hood and Holman were both prepared for a 
showdown. 
 On the surface, it appeared that Holman had the superior position, but the new 
economic landscape along the river was still evolving.  Miamisport was already five 
years old and even though it was small, there were a number of businesses established 
there along with a few settlers.  All Hood owned was an unimproved tract of land.  
According to a contemporary account, the place was in fact a mess: “the site was entirely 
covered with heavy timber and a thick, impenetrable growth of underbrush.  Not a rod 
square was cleared.”85  Fisher, the engineer, had to send men out in front of him to clear 
away the brush so he could get a sight through his surveying transit.  He didn’t even have 
a name for the town.  When Hood was pressed about a name, his only answer was that he 
didn’t care as long as it was “something short.”86  After some discussion, a few of Hood’s 
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associates chose the name Peru, an Indian word meaning “straight place in the river.”  It 
was not an auspicious start.  Under ordinary circumstances, it seems the choice for the 
state commissioners would have been simple.  Miamisport was real and Peru was only 
lines on a piece of paper, but 1834 was not a simple time on the Wabash River.  When 
the commissioners made their decision in June of 1834, they chose the unbuilt city of 
Peru as the seat of Miami County.  In this case, lines on a piece of paper were a more 
potent argument for reimagining a new landscape than was an existing town.   
 How did William Hood succeed in the face of such long odds?  The 1914 history 
of Peru at first puts it delicately, saying that “Mr. Hood was something of a diplomat.”  
Later in the same paragraph, the account states the truth bluntly: “Money Talks was 
certainly true in this instance.”87  Hood had merely done what everyone else did along the 
Upper Wabash Valley: he finagled the county seat by peddling favors and influence.  
When Hood made his pitch to the commissioners, he executed a bond stipulating that if 
Peru was chosen by the state for the county seat, he would do a number of things.  He 
promised to donate the land for a public square as well as the money to build a 
courthouse and a jail.  He promised to donate a prime city lot to each of the major 
religious denominations for the purpose of building churches.  He promised $125 for the 
establishment of a town library.  Hood also went to the merchants in Miamisport and 
promised them either free lots in the new town or ones at subsidized rates for their homes 
and businesses.  Some of the best lots went for $50.  Lastly, Hood approached two very 
influential men, Richard L. Britton and Jesse L. Williams, and sold both of them a one- 
third interest in his new town for $3,000 each.88  Britton was an influential businessman 
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and Williams was the chief civil engineer in charge of constructing the Wabash & Erie 
Canal.  In one fell swoop, William Hood gained the support of the state of Indiana (free 
courthouse and jail), religious leaders (free land for churches), local businessmen (free or 
cheap lots), the financial backing of a rich businessman (Britton), and the cooperation of 
the man who would decide where the new canal would be (Williams).  While doing this, 
he sold two-thirds of his original $500 investment for $6,000 and dramatically increased 
the value of the one-third he still owned.  Hood single-handedly changed the perception 
of his property without building anything.  It was a stroke of genius.  The imagined town 
of Peru quickly became a reality.  Joseph Holman sold his interest in Miamisport and left 
Miami County for good.  His town withered on the vine and was eventually annexed by 
Peru in 1841.   
 Peru, the “straight place on the river,” came into existence during the greatest 
time of change the Wabash River Valley ever saw.  Shifting ideas about land, water, and 
the wealth that could be extracted from them were encapsulated in historical events 
leading to the founding of Peru.  The Miami, Potawatomi, and the other Indian tribes who 
saw water as the source of spiritual life and daily labor and sustenance treated the 
Wabash River with respect, but the Americans who gained dominance over the area by 
1834 saw the Wabash in a different light. Peru was born because of the river, but men 
like Joseph Holman and William Hood didn’t see the Wabash as the source of spiritual 
life for the new town. To them the river became a commodity and the power of the water 
an economic bargaining chip to be used as a way to equate the landscape with a gold 
mine.  The river was merely a catalyst for a new economic landscape, one dictated not by 
the natural rhythm of the land and the water, but by manmade rules of business and 
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finance.  Hood and Holman literally imagined Peru into existence with a liberal 
application of wealth and influence.  They anticipated the construction of a transportation 
and trading center that would depend on the Wabash & Erie Canal for its economic 
growth.  As a consequence, a reimagined landscape evolved in which the Wabash River 
was no longer in the foreground.  Over the next eighty years, the perception of the river 
continued to change.   At first, the Wabash was an ally in the growth of the town.   After 
the decline of the canal, it became a nuisance.  Eventually, it became an enemy as the 
economic fortunes of the town fell because the river refused to behave. 
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Chapter 2: Perception versus Reality  
 Peru grew exponentially, but not exactly in the way people anticipated.  The first 
surge of economic growth for the new city began with the construction of the Wabash 
and Erie Canal.  The location of a feeder dam for the canal in Peru had long-lasting 
consequences to the economic and social fabric of the town.  The canal also brought a 
massive influx of immigrants to the region who were responsible for social and 
environmental changes to the area.  Those changes showed that the relationship between 
the human and nonhuman world were far more complicated and unpredictable than 
anyone expected.  The new landscape built along the Wabash River was not the one 
envisioned by the first Americans who settled in the region.    
 The vision of William Hood blossomed quickly.  Even before Peru was 
designated as the county seat in June of 1834, an announcement appeared in the 
Logansport Canal Telegraph calling for canal workers in the area.  Workers were offered 
three to four years work along with an opportunity to become landowners along the canal 
“through hard work.”89  Laborers gravitated to the area, drawn by the promise of an 
economic boom.  Peru was, as yet, nothing more than an idea covered in a dense tangle of 
oak, maple, and other hardwoods.  The sound of axes and saws soon echoed through the 
forest and the smoke from dozens of brush fires wafted over the Wabash as men began 
transforming the virgin forest into a new frontier town.  The town progressed from idea to 
reality rapidly as men cleared lots, converted timber into cabins, and cut arrow-straight 
paths through the forest marking new streets.   
 Most of the initial work concentrated on the land near the Wabash River where 
the canal was to be located.  When Hood, Britton, and Williams held the first land sale at 
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Miamisport on July 26, 1834, the waterfront lots sold first and brought the highest prices.  
Exact prices are impossible to ascertain because of an 1843 fire that destroyed most of 
the early land records, but the historical testimony verifies that it was a raucous, busy and 
profitable day for the land speculators.90  The owners of Peru also signed the first 
contracts for canal construction through Miami County on that day, guaranteeing an 
influx of workers and the prospect of lucrative local contracts for building materials.  
 Jesse L. Williams was the member of the ownership triumvirate most responsible 
for the pivotal event in the industrial development of Peru.  As chief engineer of the 
Wabash and Erie Canal, it was his responsibility to decide the exact location for the 
construction of a feeder dam across the Wabash River along the Miami County portion of 
the canal.91  The dam was necessary to provide a reliable source of water for the canal.  It 
would also generate the hydraulic power needed for economic development.  Williams 
chose a spot about a quarter mile below the mouth of the Mississinewa River.  This 
choice gave the fledgling town of Peru the superior economic position over Miamisport 
because of the easy availability of water power from the new dam.92  The choice was 
somewhat of a surprise because a more favorable spot seemed to be further downriver 
where the bottom was not as sandy.  A dam there would have been cheaper to build.  
However, Williams just happened to be the owner of a third of the land in Peru and had 
an economic stake in the new town.  He made his choice accordingly.  For Miamisport, 
“hopes of greatness departed.”93  Joseph Holman promptly accused Williams of 
corruption and in 1836 presented his accusation to a select committee established by the 
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Indiana House of Representatives.  Holman accused Williams of choosing the site of the 
feeder dam to “destroy the town of Miamisport for the purpose of building up and 
increasing the value of the town of Peru.”94    
 Dam sites on the proposed canal were influential for economic and political 
reasons.  Engineers like Williams were quick to recognize the clout the dams would have 
in the decision process for the location of new towns and industries, giving the engineer’s 
decisions an inordinate amount of weight.  It was not uncommon for land speculators to 
become involved in private ventures with the engineers of various canal projects in the 
hopes of influencing the location of important infrastructure.95  While his actions may 
have been questionable by today’s ethical standards, in 1834 it was acceptable practice, 
and the House of Representatives found Williams innocent.96   
 The location of feeder Dam Number Three at the eastern fringe of Peru had far 
reaching implications on early industrial development and capital growth in the area (see 
Figure 2).  The location was ideal; cheap water power and convenient access to the new 
canal made the site almost perfect.  Early industry flocked to the feeder dam because of 
the water power it provided.  A local newspaper advertised the availability of “a valuable 
mill site” for lease well before the canal reached Peru.97  The canal authority accepted 
sealed bids and a saw mill, planing mill, flouring mill, and one unidentified mill were 
constructed by entrepreneurs at the site.98   
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 If land speculation marked the first economic surge in Peru, the construction of 
the mills introduced the second wave of infusion of capital as businesses flocked to the 
area.  They provided construction materials for the canal and saw to the everyday needs 
of the laborers digging it.  Peru was rich in timber that was needed to make the lumber 
for the building of locks, dams, bridges, and aqueducts along the canal.  Mills and livery 
stables fed and shod the horses and mules dredging the canal.    
 Most importantly, a large number of canal workers quickly swelled the population 
of Peru.  Business needed to address the requirements of a growing populace.  A visitor 
to Peru in early 1835 commented that it was a small village of “one to two hundred 
inhabitants, many of whom were laborers on the canal.”99  Another contemporary visitor 
said the village was “filled with people working on the Wabash & Erie Canal from 
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different states.”100  The number of workers and immigrants grew quickly and they 
needed food to eat, liquor to drink, clothes to wear, and tools to ply their trade.  A “wild 
and rough” group of merchants swarmed to Peru and set up shop along Canal Street, 
Second Street, and Broadway.101  They wanted to be in on the ground floor as the canal 
inched toward the town.     
 An important economic and environmental corollary to the manufacturing 
geography of the new town stemmed from the fact that the industrial center was so close 
to the mouth of the Mississinewa River.  While practical at the time, it highlights the 
misperception the pioneers had about their relationship with the river.  Nineteenth 
century American ideas about Manifest Destiny contributed to a collective belief that 
nature existed to be conquered, not accommodated.  John O’Sullivan said in 1839: “We 
are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward 
march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can.”102  The “onward march” 
inspired people to gobble up land voraciously because “Land represented wealth and 
progress to the average American” who saw the frontier as an untapped source of 
riches.103   
 The man who built dam Number Three on the Wabash & Erie Canal at Peru is a 
perfect example of this vision of national destiny implemented on a local scale.  Jesse L. 
Williams was an extraordinary engineer who not only built the largest canal in the 
western hemisphere, but also went on to help build the transcontinental railroad.  He was 
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an expert in 19th century engineering techniques.104  The dam he built at Peru was 400 
feet long, 100 feet wide, and eleven feet tall and constructed out of brush, trees, and 
stone.  He reported in an 1847 report that the dam was “a safe and permanent 
structure.”105  His engineering expertise reflected the conventional view that man could 
divert and control nature.  He foresaw the possibility of floods, but was confident that his 
engineering skills could compensate for natural disasters.  His assessment of the dam was 
correct only as long as workers performed constant maintenance.  The “permanence” of 
the dam was constantly under assault by the river.  Floods, ice flows, and debris sought a 
way around or through the structure.106  It remained in place until the canal was 
abandoned and fell into disrepair.  Williams knew how to build a dam, but his vision of 
human control was limited by his understanding of the place of his dam within the natural 
landscape.  We understand now that there are consequences when people constantly alter 
their environment, digging, moving, and rearranging the land and water.  Nature always 
reacts to those changes.   
 Williams, Hood, and Britton failed to recognize that the interaction between what 
is manmade and what is not blurs the environmental line in unanticipated ways.  The 
contact is a continuous give and take that, according to Mark Fiege, results in “a process 
of alteration, intermingling, and layering, the result of which is landscape.”107  In the case 
of Peru, the landscape created by feeder dam Number Three caused the economic 
epicenter of the town to gravitate to a seemingly advantageous commercial location 
when, in fact, the manufacturing center and the business district of Peru were built in the 
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worst possible location imaginable.  The Wabash River was aimed at the town of Peru 
like a shotgun with the mouth of the Mississinewa River serving as the trigger.  No one in 
the 1830s understood the scope of what would happen when the Wabash and 
Mississinewa went over, around, and through the town.  While the new residents of the 
area understood the economic advantages of the river, they failed to recognize the 
environmental intricacies of the new urban landscape they were creating. 
 In contrast, while the Miami Indians were confused by the economic reality of the 
new landscape, they knew the nature of the river intimately.  One story in particular 
illuminates the different relationship the Indians had with the natural landscape.  When 
the construction of the canal reached the Indian village of White Raccoon, in what is now 
Huntington County, it became apparent that the cabin of the tribe’s orator and chief, Cha-
pine, was in the way of the canal bed and needed to be moved.  According to one of the 
engineers surveying the site, Cha-pine was not thrilled at the prospect of having his home 
relocated.  When he saw the canal engineers driving stakes in the ground he asked what 
they signified.  The engineers tried to explain about the canal, telling Cha-pine that the 
white man was bringing a new river to the land.  The Miami Chief took on a look of 
contempt and said “Can’t do it; won’t rain enough to fill it; White man a fool; the Great 
Spirit made the rivers.”108  Cha-pine was not an engineer, but he understood that the river 
could not be remade that easily.   
 The people of Peru learned this lesson the hard way.  The lesson began on the day 
the Wabash & Erie Canal reached Peru, the 4th of July, 1837.  By then, the population 
was between five and seven hundred and the town had almost a hundred buildings.  Many 
of the citizens were itinerant canal workers, but the number of people making Peru a 
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permanent home increased each day.  News of the impending arrival of the packet boat 
Indiana caused quite a commotion.  The town fathers planned a public ceremony to 
welcome the crew and passengers of the first canal boat and virtually everyone in town 
gathered to celebrate the momentous occasion.  The Peru Forester chronicled the events 
of the day.  By noon “the town was filled with people of the county, to witness the grand 
display on the occasion.”109  The gathering was anticlimactic.  After a long wait, word 
came that the boat had grounded at the lock by the feeder dam.  The banks of the new 
canal had not had time to settle and were absorbing more water than anticipated.  Cha-
pine’s prediction was already holding more water than the canal, but no one saw it as 
anything other than a temporary setback.  Not to be deterred, the townsfolk walked or 
rode the mile to the lock and escorted the crew and passengers back to the National Hotel 
at the corner of Miami and Canal streets where they were entertained by music and 
dancing.110  The Indiana then returned to Fort Wayne. A few days later, after the canal 
was able to hold water, it returned and was able to dock in downtown Peru, signaling the 
functional opening of the canal (see Figure 3).   
 By 1837, the economic boom finally arrived.  Up until the first canal boat docked, 
Peru’s economy was geared almost solely towards the building of the canal.  Local 
businessmen already profited from the canal workers.  Those laborers averaged 60 cents a 
day in wages.  They spent much of that money on food, clothing, and alcohol at local 
business establishments.  The lumber yards and flour mills churned out products that 
went almost exclusively to canal contractors.   
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By the middle of July, and despite the fact that the canal opened in the midst of the Panic 
of 1837, cheap manufactured goods from the east finally became available to the people 
of Miami County.  
 
 As early as two weeks after the first boat arrived in Peru, advertisements in the 
Peru Forester offered merchandise “just received from New York, via the canal” to the 
citizens of Peru and the surrounding area.  The proprietor of the store, Jacob Linzee, also 
pointed out that “most kinds of country produce and peltries [would be] taken in 
exchange for goods.”111  Mr. Linzee realized that his economic future was not defined 
solely by the boundaries of the new town.  The opening of the canal also gave outlying 
farms access to the economic boom. 
                                                          
111 Peru Forester, July 26, 1837. 
 47 
 The opening of the Wabash & Erie Canal quickly integrated the economy of Peru 
with that of the eastern U.S.  Goods could not only flow in, there was now a cheap, 
efficient way to transport local agricultural products back east.  Shipping rates quickly 
plunged from around fifteen cents a ton-mile for cargo shipped by wagon over primitive 
roads to rates of one to two cents a ton-mile on the canal, which was also much quicker 
and efficient.112  Farmers along the upper Wabash Valley increased in number, cleared 
more land, and bought modern tools shipped in on the canal.  When construction of the 
canal started in 1832, there were only about 12,000 people in the region.  By 1840, that 
number grew to 270,000.113  Canal boats that carried grain up the canal to Lake Erie 
returned with settlers from the East.  Rural land sales in Miami County grew 
exponentially as more people came to farm the land.  Between 1840 and 1850, the 
population of the counties along the canal grew over 400 percent, more than twice the 
average for the rest of Indiana.  By 1844, 400 wagonloads a day waited to unload the 
harvest at towns along the canal.114   
 The population of Peru almost tripled during the same time period, reaching 1,266 
by 1850, almost as big as Fort Wayne.115  Peru expanded steadily after the canal opened 
in 1837, with the tax base quadrupling between 1841 and 1850.116  Industry and general 
business concentrated along a waterfront that stretched approximately one and one-half 
miles along the river from the feeder dam to a point a few blocks west of Broadway.  
Canal Street in particular was a hive of activity by the early 1840s.  “The thoroughfare 
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was a locale for stores, inns, and whiskey shops, a center of sociability, a likely place for 
fights, and a roadway for wagonload after wagonload of valley grain rumbling down it to 
canal warehouses.”117   
 Evolving perception of the landscape embraced more than the economic signs of 
success.  The trappings of modern civilization slowly made their way to Peru.  One could 
eat at the Buck Tavern, so named for the hunting trophies that graced its walls.  Venison 
was on the menu, but one customer recalled the average meal as consisting of “hard 
bread, stale butter, with an old potato and an egg, sometimes rotten.”118  The first elected 
city government was organized in 1842; apparently, the biggest problem they dealt with 
was whether or not to let hogs run loose in the streets.  “Ordinance after ordinance was 
framed, but there always seemed a crack through which a pig could crawl.”119  
Civilization had reached Peru, but nature still played a role in the landscape.  Canal Street 
was the economic heart of the town (see Figure 4).  Corduroy roads that stretched from 
Peru to the small rural towns springing up in the county radiated out from Peru like the 
spokes on a wheel.  Each day, new homesteaders arrived at the docks, and each day more 
farmers cleared ground.  In turn, more crops made their way to the mills and warehouses 
along Canal Street where they were shipped east to New York or south to New Orleans 
after the canal reached Lafayette.  It was what William Cronon called “a symbiotic 
relationship between cities and their surrounding countrysides.”120  In Peru’s case, this 
relationship was totally dependent on the Wabash and Erie Canal.  But as the town grew, 
so did the tendency to forget the source of the canal’s power.   
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 The more organized Peru became, the more the new owners of the land saw a 
separation between nature and themselves.  As building after building went up along the 
canal, the less people could see of the river. The canal not only separated the river from 
the town, it seemed to separate what was manmade from what was natural.  By 1848, 
newspaper accounts in Peru mentioned canal rates, manifests, and problems on a daily 
basis, but rarely mentioned the river.  To the people of Peru, the river and the canal were 
separate entities, reinforcing Mark Fiege’s notion that “we do not normally interpret 
heavily used landscapes, places of work and production, as environments that are also 
natural.”121  The canal and its attendant waterfront were literally and figuratively above 
the river in the minds of Peruvians.   
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 When the canal began to experience unexpected economic difficulties attributable 
to intrusions by nature, people were forced to rethink the relationship between the river 
and the town, learning as Snake River Valley residents did, that “when humans disturb 
the environment, they almost invariably make it better for certain flora and fauna; 
destruction and creation go hand in hand.”122  The Wabash was no different.  People who 
lived along the river were aware of the power flowing down the Wabash; it’s why they 
came to its banks.  They had a working knowledge of the river because of their daily 
contact with it, a view shared by historian Richard White.  Speaking of the Columbia 
River, he suggested that “the river was felt in human bones and sinews; humans knew the 
river through the work the river demanded of them.”123  While that was the traditional 
way of knowing the river, by the mid 1840s the new occupants of the Upper Wabash 
River Valley saw their relationship with the river in a different light.   
 Americans saw a new landscape, one shaped by economic development, not the 
natural ebb and flow of the environment.  The Americans wanted to know the river by 
demanding that it work for them.  The Wabash & Erie Canal was the physical 
embodiment of the new economic philosophy.  The canal harnessed the power of the 
river and converted it into an economic asset that could be controlled at will by opening a 
valve or closing a lock.  Water became a commodity to be bought and sold.  An 1844 ad 
placed by the canal authority in The Miami County Sentinel asked for sealed bids for the 
right to put a water wheel at one of the new canal locks east of Peru.  The lessee would be 
entitled to “the use of all water that flows over the tumble” with the proviso that no 
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deduction in rent would be made “in consequence of a deficiency of water.”124  The canal 
was both a geographical and philosophical dividing line between the old perception of the 
landscape and the new.  When that line was eroded by nature, it called into question the 
superiority of man’s technology over the power of nature.  The canal diverted water into 
a uniform channel 40 feet wide and 4 feet deep and regulated it through a series of dams 
and locks to provide safe and economical transportation.  From a purely technological 
point of view, it seemed like a workable process.  
 In reality, the interaction between man and nature along the canal was less one-
sided and far more complicated than anyone anticipated.  Nature had not vanished; it 
merely asserted itself in different and unexpected ways.  Problems with the canal began 
even before it was finished.  Engineers failed to take into account many of the ways 
nature would affect the canal.125  For starters, it tended to leak (as evidenced by the 
failure of the Indiana to make it into Peru in 1837).  The bottom of the canal was sandy in 
many places, requiring the use of “puddle,” a waterproof material made from clay, to stop 
water absorption.  Wooden aqueducts and culverts along the path of the canal tended to 
freeze and thaw during the winter, causing numerous leaks.  Ice on the canal brought 
traffic to a halt for extended periods of time.  The Wabash River flooded periodically, 
causing breaks in the canal walls that sometimes took months to fix.  One flood in June of 
1858 caused so many breaks that the canal closed for the rest of the year.126  In extreme 
cases, breaks in the canal caused fatalities.  A break in June of 1844 about fifteen miles 
west of Peru drowned three people.127  Because of the belief that water could be 
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harnessed like one of the mules that pulled the canal boats, operation of the Wabash & 
Erie Canal was proving to be more complicated than anyone anticipated. 
 A July 13, 1844 article in the Peru Observer noted that water was back in the 
canal to Peru after a break, but that navigation to Logansport would take a few days to 
restore.  The repairs from Logansport to Lafayette were at least three weeks away from 
completion.  A three week blockage of canal traffic in July was devastating to the local 
economy.128  In an editorial one week later, the Observer excoriated the local canal 
superintendent, accusing him of delaying repairs for political purposes.  Over the next 
two weeks, the rhetoric increased as revenues declined.  Every mention of this incident in 
the Peru newspapers laid the blame for the breakages on willful negligence, political 
chicanery, or incompetence.  There was no mention of nature as an adversary to 
economic development.  In the eyes of the people who depended on the canal, failure was 
due only to lack of foresight.  “Many of the worst breaks… might have been prevented… 
had they been attended to in season.”129  Again, a few weeks later, the Peru Observer 
noted another breach by Lagro that would take 100 men a month to repair.  In another 
story in September of 1844, the newspaper exasperatingly mentioned yet another break 
near Logansport.  They couldn’t explain it because “Not a drop of rain had fallen to 
occasion it.”130  The frustration stemmed from the desire to answer a complicated 
problem with a simple solution.  The problem was not manmade or natural: it was 
manmade and natural.  This interaction between man and nature played out along the 
Wabash and Erie Canal.   
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 The banks of the canal show how this connection developed.  The banks separated 
what was manmade (the canal) from what was natural (the river), but the dividing line 
often disappeared when the banks were damaged.  Some of the damage was self-inflicted 
by those who worked the canal.  Horses and mules walking the towpath after a heavy rain 
would occasionally slip and fall into the waterway, causing damage to the banks.  Canal 
boats ran into the banks, gouging the earth and damaging pilings.  Crewmen used long 
poles to push their wayward craft back into the channel.  The poles pushed deep into the 
banks and often led to leaks.  Timber was one of the most common items shipped on the 
canal and strings of logging rafts were a common sight.  They sometimes broke loose, 
hitting banks, bridges, and aqueducts.131  Dramatic cost overruns during construction 
along with the financially disastrous state internal improvement program resulted in a 
lack of maintenance along the canal.  Mills siphoned off more water than they contracted 
for, causing water levels to drop and leading to navigation problems.  Passengers and 
crews of the canal boats denuded the land along the canal looking for firewood, which led 
to more erosion.  While the canal undoubtedly suffered from a host of manmade 
problems, there were straightforward solutions for most of them.  More problematic to 
the towns that depended on the canal were the troubles that were not manmade. 
 The largest threat to the stability of the canal came from the natural factors the 
builders of the canal either underestimated or failed to anticipate.  Weather, vegetation, 
animals, and the river all played a role in breaching the canal.  Winter travel on the canal 
was impossible.  For up to five months out of the year, the canal was closed either 
because of ice or extremes in water levels.  Freezing and thawing caused damage to 
viaducts, bridges, and the canal banks.  Heavy rains could cause breaches and make the 
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towpath unusable.  It was not uncommon for boats to wash through these breaks into a 
farmer’s field or into the river.  Salvage costs were high and many of the boats were left 
to rot, at times becoming a new home for squatters.132  At other times, drought would 
cause the water level in the Wabash River to drop below the minimum level needed to 
maintain reservoirs that fed the canal.  General upkeep of the canal was often scheduled 
for midsummer when the water level made it easier to replace locks and culverts.  
Summer was also better for maintenance because there was less seasonal economic 
pressure to keep the canal open.  It was more important to keep the canal running in the 
spring when most of the pork was shipped out and in the fall, when the harvest meant 
large grain shipments.133   
 Vegetation and animals also caused unexpected problems along the canal.  
Invasive plants along the Wabash River have a tendency to take advantage of large 
swings in water depth.  They can survive high water and spread vigorously in low 
water.134  The canal bed offered a perfect platform for the proliferation of aquatic plants 
and they soon became a serious problem.  Cattails and other weeds made navigation 
difficult in places.  Laborers faced a constant battle cutting water vegetation.  Canal 
engineers even invented a special submarine mower that worked up and down the canal 
continuously, cutting weeds.135  The weeds also made the canal a perfect breeding ground 
for fish.  They soon filled the canal in large quantities.  The fish then attracted animals 
like raccoons, muskrats, otters, and beavers.  These animals burrowed into the banks of 
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the canal, causing more breaches and erosion.136  A law which forbade fishing in the 
canal was soon abandoned as groundhogs, beaver, and other animals attracted by the 
prospect of a fish dinner turned portions of the canal into Swiss cheese.   
 Human interference was also a source of problems along the canal, as well as a 
convenient explanation for some of the thornier questions arising about the relationship 
between humans and nature along the Wabash River.  The water level of the canal was 
sometimes inconsistent, making travel unreliable even with the existence of dams and 
reservoirs.  At times, boats were stranded for days on end while shippers and newspaper 
editorials waxed eloquent on the subjects of poor management, greedy mill owners who 
drew too much water, and incompetent repair crews.137  Since problems caused by human 
shortcomings were often easier to fix than the larger environmental ones, blame for canal 
woes was sometimes directed by critics in the wrong direction.  One telling 1844 editorial 
in The Peru Observer blamed a four-week delay in opening the canal on “the negligence 
and indolence of those having charge of it.”138  It also blamed nine out of ten local 
breaches on negligence by the local superintendent even while acknowledging that “The 
water had been eating away at the banks for weeks…”139  It was far easier to blame flesh 
and bone for failure than it was to admit that humans had underestimated the place of the 
river in the new landscape they were trying to create.   
 America was in the midst of unprecedented advances in technology and most 
people had confidence in “the power of engineers and inventors to overcome 
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environmental obstacles.”140  Jesse Williams believed that with due care, the canal would 
stand against whatever troubles either humans or the river caused.  In his 1847 Chief 
Engineer’s Report to the state legislature, he constantly defined canal structures by their 
estimated lifespan.  He used phrases like “permanent for ten or fifteen years,” “needs 
renewal in two years,” and “will last one or two years longer” in his evaluation of some 
of the canal structures in and around Peru.141  His appraisal of Lock Number Nineteen at 
the east end of Canal Street stated that although it was made from cut stone, it was “not 
durable, beginning to yield to the action of the weather.  With some repairs, may last 
eight or ten years.”142  Williams knew that the technology of the day would only provide 
a finite barrier to the power of the Wabash, but he was confident that constant 
maintenance could keep the canal operating efficiently.  He was correct to a point, as 
early years of flooding along the river valley demonstrated.  Although the river constantly 
breached its banks and damaged structures, Williams stayed on top of the problem and 
kept the canal functioning.  However, while his engineering skills were strong, he 
overestimated the capacity of technology to maintain the line between man and the 
environment.  Understanding a flood on the Wabash River did not prepare the engineers 
to cope with the consequences of the human flood pouring into the Upper Wabash River 
Valley. 
 The Wabash & Erie Canal brought economic development to Peru, but not 
environmental control.  Once the canal was open, the influx of people into Miami County 
accelerated rapidly, resulting in a wild and wooly way of life along the waterfront.  Each 
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day during the season, boats of all kinds passed back and forth through Peru, stopping to 
disgorge passengers and cargo, or picking up corn and wheat from the warehouses 
springing up along Canal Street.  There were passenger packets, bateaus carrying trappers 
west, rough boats and rafts carrying immigrants, cargo boats full of nails, farm 
implements, and cloth, and factory boats loaded down with tons of potash or firewood.  
There were even entertainment boats with sides that folded out to make a stage.  Canal 
historian Robert Wallace Ford called the activities along the canal waterfronts “pure 
pandemonium,” pointing out that the canal even supported floating bordellos with women 
whose appearance on deck “brought more catcalls, whistles, and ‘goldangs!’ from the 
men on shore than any wrestling match would ever warrant.”143  While many people 
undoubtedly enjoyed watching the day to day activities along Canal Street, the general 
perception of the waterfront changed with economic growth.  In 1837, the towns 
populace marched joyfully down to the feeder dam to welcome the first canal boat and 
the prosperity it symbolized.  By the mid-1840s, as the canal was nearing its peak, people 
began to understand that the canal brought more than prosperity to Peru; it also brought 
crime and disease.   
 Crime came in many forms, but most were linked to the economic development of 
the area.  Land speculation remained rampant in Miami County.  In 1844, there was still 
more profit to be made buying and selling land than in farming it.144  The canal land 
office was located in Peru and the town became a magnet for speculators and swindlers.  
Two men named Morris and Fitzgerald pushed a dubious bill through the state legislature 
in 1846 that declared all canal lands with delinquent taxes to be forfeited to the highest 
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bidder.  The two men rushed to the land office in Peru as soon as the governor signed the 
bill.  There, in cooperation with the clerk, they locked themselves in and the two men 
began going through the records picking and choosing which plots of land to grab.  Word 
leaked out and when a large, angry crowd gathered to see what was going on, the two 
men beat a hasty retreat.  Indiana soon repealed the law.145   
  Much of the crime centered on the canal itself.  The crews on the canal boats were 
a tough bunch.  They cussed, drank, fought, and generally raised hell as they went up and 
down the canal.  Rivalries between boats led to fights along the towpath, many of which 
turned violent.  According to canal historian Paul Fatout, “A chance encounter of 
boatmen and Irishmen usually meant a donnybrook of … gouging and head-cracking… 
woe betide the innocent bystander who did not run for cover.”146  On one occasion, the 
sheriff in Peru had to ride out toward Logansport and bring in a crewman who had 
murdered a man from a competing boat with a hatchet during a race between the two 
towns.147  Citizens of the various towns on the canal were alarmed at the moral void 
along their waterfronts.  When a missionary from the Western Seaman’s Friend Society 
showed up on the Wabash in 1840 at the behest of some of the locals, he soon left, 
declaring that “there is more outbreaking wickedness here than on any other thoroughfare 
of equal magnitude in the Union.”148  Newspapers periodically bemoaned the fights and 
sinful behavior centered around the taverns at the waterfront, although they apparently 
were not immune from its effects.  The May 23, 1850, issue of the Miami County Sentinel 
marked the launching of a canal boat named the Peruvian with a brief but flowery article 
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extolling the details of the celebration.  The article explained that since the reporter was 
the most distinguished guest present, he was invited to the “old log shop” (a tavern) 
where “overpowered by excitement and corn juice, he became utterly oblivious to things 
terrestrial, and lost his notes, which is our apology for the meager [sic] account we have 
given of this imposing spectacle.”149  Not all canal workers behaved poorly, but the wild 
and wooly behavior along the docks reinforced the troubling notion that the canal was 
introducing social and environmental changes that people could not control.  
 Illnesses that spread along the canal only served to emphasize the lack of human 
control.   Sickness stemmed from two sources.  One was the transmission of various 
illnesses up and down the canal by the crews who routinely went east and south to large 
ports, especially New Orleans.  Cholera was highly feared and the newspapers carried 
regular updates on where outbreaks occurred as well as advertisements for the latest 
remedy.  In August of 1849, The Miami County Sentinel stated there was no cholera in 
Peru, but that it was “bad at Huntington and on the increase in Huntington and 
Toledo.”150  Another report admonished Peruvians to be “clean about your premises and 
persons, avoid all green fruits and vegetables…. And observe regularity of habits.”151  
New Orleans was the southern terminus for much of the grain shipped on the canal, and 
faced outbreaks of deadly diseases like cholera and yellow fever.  A series of epidemics 
in the city, culminating with a yellow fever outbreak in 1853 that killed over 10,000 
people, prompted a change in the way people looked at their relationship with the river 
“and what they called nature.”152  There were never any outbreaks along the Wabash & 
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Erie Canal that rivaled the deaths in New Orleans, but death from cholera did claim many 
lives along the canal.  Fort Wayne suffered outbreaks in 1849, 1852, and 1854.  
Contemporary newspaper accounts relate the apprehension of the citizens of Fort Wayne 
each year as the disease worked its way up the canal line.153  These periodic outbreaks 
were especially unnerving because they showed that the canal introduced changes to the 
river valley that humans could not control.    
 Other health problems stemmed from the nature of the canal itself and the 
carelessness of the people who used it.  Many factories and houses stood close to the 
canal.  As the canal grew more urban, the more polluted it became.  The canal was also a 
dump for trash, garbage, and both human and animal waste.  In the summer, disease 
carrying mosquitoes proliferated in stagnant canal water.  This led to many outbreaks of 
diarrhea, diphtheria and other contagions, many with canal-specific names.  DeWitt C. 
Goodrich was born in Miami County, but his family moved to Kansas in 1855 because of 
the health problems along the Wabash River.  He remembered “nearly everybody was 
initiated into the disagreeable and discouraging intricacies of fever and ague, commonly 
known the country over as the ‘Wabash Shakes.’  Few escaped this miasmatic scourge.  
My father concluded to get away from it…”154  Newspapers carried ads for pills and 
potions guaranteed to cure the various ailments of the local populace.  One of the 
favorites in the Peru papers was Dr. Bragg’s Fever and Ague Pills, “HARD TO BEAT!”  
The pills “swept everything before them …in the cure of Ague, Billious[sic], and Chill 
Fevers.”155 
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 The health problems inherent to the canal were a direct result of the mistaken 
belief that people could change the landscape while remaining separate from it.  Ari 
Kelman, speaking of the 1853 yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans, explained that 
even though the people of that city thought they had engineered away many of their 
problems, the epidemic proved that the nonhuman world could resist “everyday decisions 
made by people who sought to impose social, economic, and spatial order on their 
environment.”156  That is exactly what the people along the canal were trying to do.  They 
were attempting to shape the world surrounding the Wabash & Erie Canal to fit 19th-
century ideas about economic, social, and spatial order.  They built the canal to make a 
new country and economy.  On one hand, it was wildly successful, bringing an economic 
boom to Miami County.  On the other hand, it also defied attempts by the populace to 
confine it within the boundaries set by 19th century engineering, and became a leaky, 
weed-choked, unhealthy, corrupting influence on the Upper Wabash Valley.  Humans 
had attempted to separate what was manmade from what wasn’t and found that it was a 
difficult thing to do.  Many people quit referring to it as the Wabash & Erie Canal and 
simply called it “The Ditch.”157 
 Despite its drawbacks, the canal remained an economic boon to the city of Peru 
from the 1840s until the railroads caused its decline in the 1850s.  The industrial growth 
of the town traced a narrow path that paralleled the river.  Industry spread west from the 
feeder dam for approximately 1 ½ miles along Canal Street.  The town became more 
urbanized as the economic infrastructure expanded.  An editorial in the July 27, 1848 
edition of the Miami County Sentinel sang the praises of Peru, calling it “the favored spot 
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of creation” and the author proudly enumerated a long list of businesses to prove the 
point.158  The town boasted of dry goods stores, tin shops, drug stores, carpenters, 
cabinet, and chair shops, blacksmiths, a hatter, shoe stores, saddler and wagon maker 
shops, carding machines, sawmills, gristmills, “and almost every kind of manufactures in 
such abundance.”159  There were at least three brick business houses on Broadway and 
frame houses in every direction “where once stood the neat log cabin.”  The town 
population was listed at 1,005, while the county had 7,000 residents, a rapid growth rate 
for the time.  The paper was proud of the numbers and pointed out that, not only could 
the town provide for the entire county population, they had “sufficient surplus to furnish 
all the little villages east of us along the canal.”160  In reference to agriculture within 
Miami County, the article pointed out the large number of grain warehouses on the canal 
“with capital to purchase, and capacity to store, all the grain we raise” because of the 
fertility of the soil and dedication of local farmers.  The article ended with a reference to 
the elements of greatness within Peru, claiming that, if necessary, the town could “live 
perfectly independent of the rest of the world, were we surrounded by a Chinese wall…” 
if necessary.161  This was Manifest Destiny at work.  Peruvians had taken “a favored spot 
of creation” and bent it to the economic will of a new landscape. 
 The editor of the Sentinel didn’t realize it at the time, but the rise of an 
agricultural economy in the region would eventually make the people of Peru wish they 
were, indeed “surrounded by a Chinese wall.”  Peru was in the midst of an economic 
boom by the 1850s; people poured into Miami County because of the accessibility to 
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cheap land along the canal.  The rich, fertile farmland the Sentinel bragged about lured 
settlers to the area.  The canal made it easy to get the implements and supplies they 
needed to clear the land and start farms, as well as market the products grown on those 
farms.  As a result, hundreds of thousands of acres in Miami County and all along the 
Upper Wabash Valley were cleared and converted to crop production.  The Upper 
Wabash Valley had originally been covered with timber and wetlands, but by 1860, 
1,211,000 acres in the area had been improved, almost 50 percent of the total acreage. 162  
Miami County comprised 384 square miles, or 245,760 acres of that total.163  When the 
county was created in 1834, approximately 64,835 acres of it was wetlands with almost 
16,500 of those acres permanently covered with water.  That translates to 27 percent of 
the total acreage.  Cass County was almost 37 percent wetlands and other counties along 
the Wabash had similar percentages.164   
 In its natural state, the land along the upper Wabash Valley worked like a sponge, 
soaking up rainfall and runoff and allowing it to work its way gradually down to the 
Wabash River.  There was very little erosion and the slow drainage helped to prevent 
wide swings in the depth of the river.  The Mound builders, the Miami Indians, and other 
people who lived in the region before 1832, left a very small footprint on the land.  Their 
agricultural methods were on too small a scale to alter the landscape and when the river 
flooded, they simply moved to higher ground.  The Wabash & Erie Canal altered the 
environment dramatically.  It conveyed thousands of land-hungry immigrants into the 
area who cleared the land and built ditches to drain it.   
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 As early as 1845, George Winter, the Hoosier artist who documented Miami 
Indian life, moved to Logansport.  He noted “the effects of the partial clearing of the 
country.” 165  He wrote in his journal that the rapid clearing of land “has had a striking 
effect on the affluents [sic] of the Wabash” and that “the beautiful islands are beginning 
to wash away under the influence of the greater volume of water that fills the banks and 
the increased rapidity of the current of the river.”166  The amount of silts and clays in the 
bottom also increased greatly.167  The Wabash River felt the impact, becoming more 
turbid and erratic in discharge.  The Wa-Ba-Shiki would never be clear again.   
 The growth of Miami County occurred at a furious pace.  The value of taxable 
property in the county grew from $401,354 in 1841 to $4,265,763 in 1860, a tenfold 
increase.168  Men built and improved roads on a regular basis, allowing rural areas better 
access to Peru, but farmers wanted one improvement above all others: drainage for their 
cropland.  The building of ditches and installation of tiles proceeded at furious pace, 
opening vast tracts of land to cultivation.  The same thing happened in other counties and 
agricultural output in the region skyrocketed.  In 1844, the Wabash & Erie Canal shipped 
5,000 bushels of corn to the port in Toledo.  By 1846, the number increased to 500,000, 
and in 1851, 2,775,149 bushels of corn traveled up the canal to Toledo.169  The change 
was dramatic, but what was seen by most people as an improvement was also an attempt 
to impose human economic and spatial order on the environment.   
 The consequences of environmental change to the Wabash River affected every 
city along the canal, but none more than Peru.  In their efforts to develop Miami County, 
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residents destabilized the natural ability of the land to control the flow of water into the 
Wabash and Mississinewa rivers.  Will Hundley was a young man when his family 
moved to Miami County in 1875 to teach farming to what was left of the Miami Indians 
in the area.  They lived in a place the locals called Squawtown, in the rich bottomland 
where the Mississinewa and Wabash rivers met.  The area contained large stands of 
timber, but the forests were disappearing rapidly as teams of men worked daily cutting 
cordwood to feed the boilers of the Peru Brewery and other businesses.  Even as a young 
boy, Hundley lamented the loss of the trees and recalled in later years the “grief at seeing 
an axe sink into their bodies” as dozens of axe men denuded the countryside cutting 
firewood for Peru.170  He was watching a great environmental change in the local 
landscape.  One long term consequence of 19th-century deforestation was noted when a 
1911 soil survey showed a complete absence of water storage capacity due to the lack of 
wooded land and drainage efforts.  “The land has been systematically drained, and the 
forests removed… Before the land was artificially drained there was considerable natural 
storage… the discharge of the Mississinewa River is very irregular.”171  In an effort to 
manage the flow of water along the upper Wabash Valley, humans created even more 
destabilization of the rivers they sought to control. 
 John Stephens said in 1896 that drainage was one of the indexes by which to 
“gauge the civilization of a country.”172  Both he and Arthur Bodurtha devote chapters of 
their respective Miami County histories to the subject of drainage, reflecting the 
importance of the subject to local history, but missing the environmental consequences of 
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unbridled expansion.  Bodurtha looked back in 1914 and wrote of the recollections of 
some of the old settlers.  They could remember when spring brought heavy rains and 
melting snow, turning the countryside into a morass.  Much of the county consisted of 
wetlands that in their natural state “were the source of much of the fever and ague with 
which the early settlers had to contend.”  Farmers dug hundreds of miles of ditches in 
order to make the land usable.  By 1869, a more efficient way of draining land emerged 
with the introduction of a clay tile system of drainage and most of Miami County 
wetlands quickly disappeared, destroying the buffer needed to prevent spring runoff from 
reaching the rivers all at once.  In the eyes of the local historian, “Drainage has not only 
improved the land for agricultural purposes …it has also improved the health of the 
county’s inhabitants.”173  The fact that this was still the prevailing view in 1914, when 
Bodurtha wrote, reinforces the view that no one truly understood the cost of tinkering 
with the landscape around Peru.  
 The rapid draining of hundreds of thousands of acres of land had an immediate 
impact on the Wabash River.  The erosion George Winter observed in the spring of 1845 
was soon evident everywhere and only increased with time.  The river got muddier as 
banks caved in and floods became more frequent.  Unlike the Miami Indians, the 
residents of Peru, Wabash, Logansport, and other towns along the river couldn’t just pack 
up and move to high ground when the river flooded.  Most of the industry and commerce 
in these towns was concentrated close to the canal, which put much of the local economy 
at the mercy of the Wabash River.  Peru was in an exceptionally vulnerable spot because 
of its proximity to the confluence of the Wabash and Mississinewa Rivers.  This location 
aggravated the chances for severe damage from flooding. The industrial center for the 
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town grew up by the feeder dam for the canal, an extremely vulnerable position less than 
a mile downriver from where the two rivers met.  But, the site was large and well suited 
for industry, with easy access to water power.  If not for the dam, Miamisport would 
probably have been the county seat and Peru would not have been built.  In 1834, no one 
worried about the potential for major flood damage because there was no known pattern 
to suggest it was a problem.  Unfortunately for the people who lived along the Upper 
Wabash Valley, the behavior of the river became more unpredictable with each tree felled 
and every ditch dug.  Erratic water levels triggered a sequence of events that conflicted 
with the assumptions that citizens had made about human control of the landscape around 
Peru.    
 The assumption that man was in control of the environment proved incorrect.  
Technology produced the canal, but it couldn’t guarantee the cooperation of nature.  
Engineering fixed broken banks, but ground hogs burrowed right back through them.  
Workers built dams to create reservoirs for the canal, but they couldn’t make it rain, nor 
stop it once it started.  Chief Cha-pine was prescient when he snorted in disgust at the 
ditch Jesse Williams wanted to run through his parlor.  The idea that man could tame the 
power of the Wabash River with a canal was self-defeating.  The Wabash & Erie Canal 
was not separate from the landscape of the Upper Wabash Valley, it was part of it.  Each 
whiskey swilling, feverish canal boat crewman proved it.  To paraphrase Mark Fiege, 
what was human along the Wabash and what was natural was difficult to separate.  The 
People along the river altered their environment, but nature had the capacity, in turn, to 
change what humans did, shifting the definition of landscape.   Failure to appreciate the 
capacity of nature to adapt to a changing landscape blinded the people of Peru to the 
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consequences of building their town where they did.  It was only when nature pushed 
back and almost destroyed the town during the 1913 flood that people began to perceive 
the true relationship with the Wabash River. 
 69 
Chapter 3: Consequences  
 The disaster visited on Peru by the 1913 flood was the culmination of decades of 
misperception about the relationship between town and the Wabash River.  Monetary 
considerations dictated the site of the town without regard for the potential of the river to 
destroy it.  The Wabash & Erie Canal in general and feeder dam number three in 
particular promised great economic growth for the town of Peru and the surrounding area.  
That growth included a dramatic increase in population, the conversion of thousands of 
acres of natural wetlands into farmland by the introduction of drainage tiles and irrigation 
ditches, and the growth of industry along the Wabash River.  The residents of the area 
saw these changes as signs of rapid economic progress although there was evidence that 
economic changes were accompanied by less desirable social and environmental 
consequences.  Human attempts to control the landscape through technology were 
ineffective.  Nature continually interfered with the canal, causing expensive delays and 
repairs to the system.  When the railroad, a technologically superior transportation 
method, took over, it brought its own set of problems to the landscape.  Human tinkering 
with the natural drainage of the area contributed to changes along the Wabash River and 
increased the damage caused by periodic flooding.  Eventually, the 1913 flood devastated 
Peru, defining both a physical and economic high water mark that was never surpassed as 
well as exposing the misconception that the residents of the town controlled the 
landscape surrounding them.   
 Joseph Holman and William Hood built Peru on the premise that man could 
overcome nature and harness it for economic gain, a perception that one biographical 
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sketch lauded as “the natural and artificial resources which Peru has under control.”174  
The canal was the chief manifestation of human control of local resources, but 
technological advances during the 19th century soon made it obsolete.  Local perception 
of the landscape evolved as humans sought more control over the transportation system 
that drove the economic engine of the area.  The railroads replaced the canal, men cleared 
and drained land, and the city of Peru grew, but environmental changes that accompanied 
the process went unnoticed for the most part until the Wabash River became increasingly 
erratic, teaching the lesson that technology does not always equal control.   
 Railroads emerged as the technologically superior form of transportation in the 
1850s, causing the canal lose money.  The original purpose of the canal as an economic 
engine for the Wabash Valley was tempered by the reality that it had many drawbacks as 
a mode of transportation when compared to the railroad.  The economic relationship 
between humans and the canal was dependent on water.  While the canal was physically 
separate from the river, it was susceptible to seasonal as well as less predictable changes 
of the Wabash.  Even before the canal system was completed, the fledgling railroad 
industry loomed as a potent competitor in the region and canal fever was gradually 
replaced by railroad fever.   
 The advantages of railroads over canals were numerous.  Railroads operated 
twelve months out of the year, provided direct transportation to cities not connected by 
canals, and were more reliable than the leaky, high-maintenance canal beds.  Moreover, 
canal boats were forced to creep along at speeds under five miles per hour to prevent a 
bow wave and subsequent erosion of the banks.  Most canal cargo also had to be 
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transferred from boat to boat before arriving at its destination, while rail cargo rarely 
needed transshipment.  Trains were much faster and offered the added benefit of greater 
cargo capacity, meaning cheaper rates and faster service.   
 These facts were not lost on the town fathers in Peru.  The canal brought the first 
wave of farmers and industry to the area and defined the geography of the town, but it 
was the railroads that ultimately capitalized on the strong agricultural trade established 
with eastern markets.  Even as the Wabash & Erie Canal fueled the growth of Miami 
County during the 1840s, many voices embraced the idea of making Peru a major rail 
terminal.  By 1849, Peru newspapers carried the public debate on whether or not the 
county should vote for a $20,000 subscription to start a rail line from Indianapolis to 
Peru.  Voters approved, but the money soon ran out.  It took almost five more years for 
investors to raise enough capital for completion of the line.  It was a process occurring 
across the state.  Between 1850 and 1860, investors spent over $34,000,000 and railroad 
mileage in Indiana expanded from 228 miles to 2,163 miles.175   
 The construction of the rail lines in and around Peru altered the urban landscape 
in key ways, expanding the industrial base within the town as well as altering the natural 
floodplain for both the Mississinewa and Wabash rivers.  The Peru & Indianapolis 
Railroad finally reached Peru in the spring of 1854, opening a new era in transportation, 
dooming the canal to a slow death, and expanding the economic base of Peru with 
hundreds of railroad-related jobs.176  The Indianapolis-Peru line was quickly followed by 
another railroad company, the Wabash, St. Louis, & Pacific Railway, formed with the 
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intention of building a line down the length of the Wabash Valley from Toledo to St. 
Louis.  When asked to speak about the advisability of building this line, Daniel Pratt, a 
wealthy Logansport businessman, signed a sizable check to the new rail company, 
commenting “There is my speech.”177  Other people agreed and the line was soon 
underway, making Peru a major rail hub in the process.  Over the ensuing years, at least 
five railroads built lines through Peru, but the Indianapolis and Wabash are the two lines 
that had the greatest economic impact on Miami County.  
 The immediate consequence of the transition to rail transportation was the 
diversification of industry within Peru.  By the time the Wabash & Erie Canal was 
abandoned in 1875, Peru’s main industrial area was well established along the Wabash 
River.  The area along the old feeder dam contained a woolen mill, a distillery, and a 
massive, seven acre complex built for the Howe Sewing Machine Company.  Various 
peripheral businesses were also located there.  It remained the most concentrated 
industrial area in the city (see Figure 5).  Stretching along the river further to the west 
were a number of large planing, saw, bagging, and woolen mills, as well as breweries, a 
foundry, and various smaller factories manufacturing everything from cabinets to wheels. 
 Some of the businesses depended on water power, but not all.  An abundance of locally 
cut wood made steam power a viable alternative and many industries went that route. 
Others took advantage of the introduction of natural gas in 1874.  By 1879, a new bridge 
over the Wabash River on Broadway opened up South Peru to industry and various small 
manufacturers soon moved there as well.178   
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 The Indianapolis-Peru railroad supported the older industries because the line was 
built partially on the old canal bed, continuing to provide convenient access for the 
loading and unloading of cargo.  It also provided an opportunity for new industrial areas 
to flourish as spur lines reached out to new factories.  The Wabash line cut across the 
north side of Peru and industry soon gravitated to it.  The area was attractive in part 
because it was away from the river.  Only once in the past, in 1847, had floodwaters been 
deep enough to reach the ridge north of town, and in the 1850s, the city dug a large ditch 
around the north side of town for the express purpose of rerouting floodwater away from 
the area in order to make the location safe for expansion.  Warehouses, a new depot, and 
repair facilities for the railroad provided a nexus for the new industrial district.  By 1875, 
the economy was thriving.  
 By 1875, the growth of the railroads made Peru’s economy much less reliant on 
water power and as a result, the nature of the relationship between the town and the river 
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changed.  The Wabash & Erie Canal, awash in red ink, was finally abandoned by the 
state in the face of competition from the railroads.  The area along Canal Street, once 
looked on with pride by Peruvians as the economic heart of the town, was worn around 
the edges.  The feeder dam washed out late that year and was never repaired.179  Long 
stretches of the canal remained, but lack of maintenance turned them into stagnant pools 
of water which brought nothing but complaints from the townsfolk.180  The separation of 
the river and the town increased when the railroad took over the old canal bed, ending the 
economic dependency on water and making many of the warehouses and businesses 
along Canal Street obsolete.  Heavy industry still dominated the area, but many new 
businesses moved into other parts of town, leaving the once thriving waterfront to 
deteriorate.  The Wabash River overflowed periodically, leaving a foot or so of water 
along Canal Street, making a mess and costing businesses money.  Canal Street lost its 
luster and the Wabash River became increasingly irrelevant to town planning as it 
diminished in economic importance.  As a result, the people ignored the natural role the 
river played in the urban, industrial, and agricultural landscape they created.  As people 
implemented these changes along the river valley, unintended environmental changes 
accompanied the process. 
 When engineers built the first rail lines in the 1850s and 1860s, they gave little 
consideration to what might happen if the Wabash flooded because they didn’t fully 
understand the pronounced effect of agricultural drainage into the river.  Floods in Peru 
were generally mild and confined to the waterfront. As a result, the potential 
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environmental impact of rail bed design on the land was ignored.  Mid 19th century 
construction techniques were simple and effective.  Engineers saw the laying of rail lines 
as an exercise in rising above topographical problems presented by the natural landscape, 
so they did just that -- they rose above.  The rail bed was almost always raised above 
ground level in what was known as the Whittemore form, a standard construction 
technique of the time which allowed for a stable and easily drained foundation.181  The 
end result was a sloped mound about thirty feet wide at the bottom and roughly ten to 
twelve feet wide at the top.  On level terrain, the bed would be five to eight feet high.  In 
other words, the roadbed design also doubled as a sturdy dike, capable of diverting 
massive amounts of water if constructed across a floodplain like that at the confluence of 
the Wabash and Mississinewa rivers.   
 Engineers did not see this as a major problem at the time. William Raymond’s 
1914 bible for railroad construction, The Elements of Railroad Engineering, makes no 
mention of environmental consequences of railroad construction.  There was no 
consideration of potential flooding, only normal drainage.  The only nod to the potential 
power of water in the manual was the recommendation that ditches at least one foot deep 
be preserved when digging dirt for the rail embankment from what was known as a 
borrow pit.  In that way, the raised rail bed would have “thorough drainage and freedom 
from snow drifts” as well as provide a way for natural runoff, although normally 
(according to engineers of the time), “the matter will usually take care of itself.”182  This 
was the basic construction method used when the first rail lines reached out toward Peru.   
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 The engineers were not careless when they failed to factor in the hydraulic power 
of the Wabash River on a landscape being dissected by both railroads and modern 
drainage systems.  It is an example of the incomplete understanding prevalent in the mid 
1800s of the relationship between rivers and the manmade landscape in general.  What 
seemed simple was not.183  The inhabitants of Miami County blissfully crisscrossed the 
countryside with roads, rails, ditches, drains, and tiles, unaware that their relationship 
with the natural world was not simply one of control, but rather a complicated interaction 
that affected the environment in unforeseen ways.   
 Peru was firmly established as a rail and business center by 1875.  Thanks to the 
legacy of the canal, economic output was strong, with Wabash, Miami, and Cass counties 
consistently ranked in the top tier of wage distribution for the state.184  The population 
grew slowly but consistently, and passed 4,000 at about this time.185  The boundaries of 
the town expanded along the river to accommodate growth and by 1875 Peru reached the 
basic form that it retains to the present day.  In just over 40 years, settlers transformed 
untrammeled wetlands and forests into an orderly, industrious town hugging the banks of 
the Wabash.  An 1897 description of the community shows that the citizens of Peru were 
proud of the town and saw their handiwork as the result of the ability of Man to control 
nature: “From the day of its foundation, Peru has been prosperous, and has grown entirely 
through force of circumstances and has attained its prominence through natural causes 
alone.”186  “Force of circumstances” was another way of saying Manifest Destiny on a 
local scale.  Peruvians had succeeded because of their natural ability to harness and 
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exploit the resources around them, especially the river.  The same volume also claims 
“That the city has reached its present position upon a foundation secure beyond per-
adventure is but a convincing proof of the certainty with which nature secures her 
ends.”187  Again, it was a recognition of nature, but one that split the definition of the 
word in two.  To the pioneers who had seen the changes their axes and saws made to the 
land, Peru represented the transformation of nonhuman nature into a superior, final form, 
human civilization.  The assumption was that the wilderness was conquered by the 
pioneers and that nature now existed to serve the needs of Man.   
 It was a costly misperception to believe that human society could separate Peru 
from the Wabash River.  Many of the technological advances that Peruvians looked 
proudly to as proof that nature was tamed were, in reality, evidence that the dividing line 
between the Wabash River and the town was tenuous at best.  Starting with the Wabash 
& Erie Canal and extending to the new railroads that replaced it, the citizens of the Upper 
Wabash Valley utilized the transportation system to fuel tremendous growth in the 
agricultural output of the region.  As a result of this growth, the main function of the 
Wabash River changed from that of transportation to one of drainage for newly cleared 
farmland.  The installation of ditches and drains along the Upper Wabash River Valley 
reveals that the agricultural experts and hydrological engineers of the time continued to 
see the local environment as a resource they could manipulate and control. 
  The statewide movement to modernize transportation and drain the land grew in 
scope as the years passed.  In 1875, the Indiana state legislature passed the first of a 
number of laws outlining the procedures for installing drainage ditches and tiles.  Farmers 
had been draining cropland for decades, but this was the first mechanism instituted by the 
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state to organize and control the effort.  By 1893, the system evolved into a coordinated 
arrangement to build and maintain the thousands of miles of ditches and tiles in Indiana, 
but little effort was expended by state engineers in determining the environmental impact 
of the work.  By 1890, more than 1,500,000 acres of Indiana swampland was drained.188  
By 1895, Indiana had over 30,000 miles of tile and ditches.189  By 1896, Miami County 
alone had 204 miles of main-line drainage ditches.  This number did not include the 
satellite branches connected to the major ones.190   Each town along the river also built 
sewer systems to divert rainwater into the river.  Almost two thirds of the state (32,600 
square miles) drained into the Wabash River and as the years passed, the river level 
tended to be more erratic than in the past.191  Runoff that used to take months to flow 
down the Wabash now reached the river in a matter of days. 
 Coupled with erosion caused by the rapid deforestation of the watershed, the 
increased amount of runoff put mounting pressure on the Wabash.  The U.S. Geological 
Survey in 1896 recognized that changes were occurring to the river: “The effect of 
settlement has been to afford better surface drainage by opening ditches and removing 
obstructions, and thus to lessen the amount of saturation.  Cultivation of fields, leading as 
it usually does to a more rapid escape of water over the surface, also tends to lessen the 
degree of saturation.”192  The USGS survey drew no specific conclusions about the 
meaning of the findings, and the significance of the impact on the Wabash River was not 
addressed in the report, but the rapid escape of surface water meant higher average river 
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levels during the spring runoff, leaving lower levels in the summer.  The average summer 
flow of the river fell from an estimated 6,740 cfs (cubic feet per second) in 1833 to only 
3,750 cfs by 1881.193  The average spring flow is not mentioned in the survey, but 
according to National Weather Service records, there were floods in Peru approximately 
14 times between the years 1847 and 1913.  These were floods exceeding 20 feet, the 
flood stage for the Wabash River at Peru.194   
 There is no better way to illustrate the cumulative effect of the environmental 
changes that took place in the vicinity of Peru than by looking at the changes in the 
Wabash River beginning in the second half of the 19th century.  The seasonal swings in 
water levels became stronger, resulting in increasingly strong flooding of the Wabash.  
The increased threat of flooding also caused a shift in the way people saw the river.  The 
residents of the area originally ignored the river as anything other than a power source for 
the local economy, but the change in the behavior of the Wabash caused a shift in the 
locals perceptions.  The river came to represent a danger to the economy of the region, 
especially the vulnerable industrial district in Peru.  By cross referencing the NOAA 
flood dates with the Peru newspapers, it is possible to assess the change in attitude of 
townspeople toward the place of the river within the landscape as the flooding of the 
Wabash River increased in severity, evolving from a seasonal nuisance to an economic 
nightmare.   
 Over the latter half of the 19th century, the river became increasingly more 
volatile, but initially, the people of Peru considered the temperamental nature of the 
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Wabash as a normal part of life.  There was no serious attempt made by the original 
inhabitants of Peru to guard against the seasonal vagaries of the river because the 
flooding was usually minor and was accepted by locals as an occasional intrusion by 
nature, not a loss of control over the environment.  The local papers carried neither an 
outcry for flood control nor complaints about the river.  Contemporary newspapers don’t 
even mention many of the minor floods of the mid 19th century, lending credence to the 
idea that floods were seen by Peruvians as a minor inconvenience not worth mentioning.  
They brought a few inches of water to Canal Street and associated areas, and usually 
retreated in a few hours.  If the newspaper accounts mention them at all, it is in a 
perfunctory manner that offered little information about damage.  These floods resulted 
in roughly ten to fourteen inches of water overflowing the banks of the Wabash with 
minor damage to businesses and varying levels of crop damage, depending on the time of 
year.  It was a nuisance, but not a serious challenge to human control of the landscape.   
 On at least six different occasions, however, major floods challenged the 
perception that humans were in control.195  Local newspaper accounts all agree that the 
first major flood to hit Peru was in January of 1847.  It was caused by an ice dam on the 
river, but there are few contemporary descriptions of the event.  Most accounts were 
related by the town’s old-timers during later floods.  The next major flood of note to hit 
Peru after 1847 was in August of 1875.  Although contemporary accounts fail to mention 
it, this one was unusual because most of the floods hit during what was known as the 
annual “freshet,” an old term for the spring thaw and the heavy rains that accompanied it.  
The 1875 flood, caused by a few days of torrential downpours, demonstrated the 
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increasing volatility of the Wabash River.  It was the first big summer flood to hit the 
town.  By 1875, Peru and the surrounding rural area had grown to the point where a flood 
could do some major damage. The August flood did just that.  The newspaper defined it 
in biblical terms, calling it a “Deluge” and claiming: “Shades of Father Noah Invoked, 
Demand for Gopher Wood or any Ark Timber.”196  While the headlines were tongue-in-
cheek, the byline was serious, mentioning “Fearful Losses in the Wabash Valley.”197  At 
Peru, the Mississinewa River exploded over the north bank of the Wabash at their 
confluence and spread over the lowlands on the north side of the river, even submerging 
the railroad tracks running between Peru and Wabash.  The newspaper claimed the high-
water mark to be less than two feet from the 1847 flood, but considered the 1875 flood to 
be worse: “Then [1847] the river was full of ice, the channel was narrow and the passage 
of the water obstructed much more than during the recent freshet.”198  The consensus was 
that the 1875 flood involved a much larger volume of water despite the fact that the 1847 
flood was higher.  No article mentioned the impact of manmade changes to the 
watershed, nor offered any explanation for the unusual timing of the event. 
 In what would become a trend over the ensuing years, the 1875 newspaper 
accounts listed various businesses and the damage they incurred.  The Howe 
Manufacturing plant at the old feeder dam was flooded with three feet of water and much 
of their lumber was swept away.  Other factories had lumber or other inventory washed 
away.  The entire downtown business district received water damage of some kind.  
South Peru, being several feet lower than the ground north of the river, suffered even 
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worse flooding.199  Losses in the rural areas around Peru were also high.  Corn crops 
were drowned and most of the season’s wheat crop was still in the field, drying in shocks. 
It was all destroyed.200  The floodwaters devastated most of the Wabash Valley, wiping it 
clean.  When the flood was over, men found an old canal boat wedged against the 
railroad bridge in west Peru.  No one knew where it came from, but it had undoubtedly 
been abandoned somewhere along the old canal bed east of Peru and swept away when 
the flood washed away the banks of the canal in many places.  The flood also destroyed 
most of the old feeder dam, reclaiming what man had built, erasing much of the 
imaginary line between man and nature, and putting an exclamation point on the finale of 
the Wabash & Erie Canal in Peru.201 
 No one put a dollar amount on the losses caused by the 1875 flood, but it was 
significant because of the growing number of business interests along the river.  Many of 
the industries along the Wabash saw their raw materials and inventory float away, 
destroying large amounts of uninsured capital.  The Howe Sewing Machine Company, 
employing 500 people, went bankrupt soon after the flood and was sold by investors to 
the Indiana Manufacturing Company.202  Other businesses, unable to absorb their losses, 
also closed.  Crop losses in the lowlands were virtually 100 percent, causing some farms 
to fail.203  The economic impact on Peru was heavy, yet city leaders didn’t address the 
problem.  No one had perished in the flood, but there was no organized relief system to 
aid victims after it ended.  Other than advice on how to disinfect foul cellars, and a 
reprimand to flood gawkers that “the visitors at the dam last Sunday were more numerous 
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than the visitors at the churches,” the newspapers provided no more information about the 
flood after August 20th.204  Peru soon returned to normal.  This flood does not even 
receive a mention in Arthur Bodurtha’s comprehensive history of Peru, published only 
thirty-nine years after the event.  The people of Peru saw flooding as an act of nature that 
sometimes crossed the dividing line between what was natural and what they had built.  
As such, they saw it as a temporary nuisance that accompanied their use of nature, so 
they ignored it.  In 1875, that was still an option. 
 The citizens of the town could ignore the river, but the river refused to ignore 
them.  The more Peru’s economy grew, the more problematic the floods became.  City 
fathers wanted to promote Peru as the best location for new commercial interests in the 
region, but the threat of flooding erased the perceived line between the town and the river 
and made Peru a very poor choice for investment.  Unlike the minor floods of the past, 
the severity of the 1875 flood created a situation where Peru had nothing to gain and 
everything to lose if the perception of the river shifted to give it a more prominent role in 
the landscape.  The townspeople could rationalize away the role of Man in the disaster by 
calling it an Act of God.  After all, people were helpless “when compared to the terrible 
power of the nonhuman world, whether ‘God’ or ‘Nature.”205  By comparing the 1875 
flood to a biblical deluge and inferring that the citizens of Peru needed an ark, the 
newspapers drew attention away from the fact that the flood damage had more to do with 
the location of local industry and the impact of farming than it did the will of God.   
 It was not until the flood of 1883 that townsfolk began to recognize the 
predicament they were in along the banks of the Wabash.  It was the third major flood to 
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hit Peru.  It was also the worst to that point.  The flood hit Peru during the first week of 
February after three days of heavy sleet and rain and a massive ice storm.  The flood 
crested about three feet above flood stage and caused damage comparable to the 1875 
flood.  The Peru Republican reported that the rapid rise of the river was due to the fact 
that a thick coating of ice prevented any water from soaking into the ground.206  Ice dams 
on the Wabash further complicated matters.  The flood started on Friday, February 2nd 
and crested on Sunday, the 4th.  The Republican reported that “never before was such an 
expanse of country here covered by the Wabash.”207  The Mississinewa again pushed 
north over the railroad embankment and filled the prairie around Peru with over two feet 
of water.  The reporting of this flood also marks the first time newspapers made mention 
of the need to rescue people with boats as well as rumors (later proven false) that a family 
east of town had drowned.  It is also the first time that a local relief committee was 
organized to administer aid to flood victims.208   
 This meant that the local population was beginning to see the floods in a new 
light.  They no longer looked upon floods as a mere nuisance; flooding now affected the 
personal and working lives of thousands of people.  A reporter for the paper visited the 
Indiana Manufacturing plant and found that the water level had reached three and one-
half feet high on the first floor.  Workers at the plant had scrambled to secure lumber and 
equipment, preventing massive damage, although the company still suffered over $5,000 
in losses.  This time around, the paper carried many personal interest stories about the 
flood and far less information on what it did to the economy of the town.  The headline 
was “Frost and Flood: Destructive Deluge on the Wabash and the Ohio and the 
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Mississippi Valleys,” another allusion to a biblical flood.209  Once again, this reinforced 
the belief that the flood was an act of God, unrelated to human development along the 
river valley.   
 The paper also covered in detail the light-hearted discussion among old-timers on 
whether or not the 1847 or 1883 flood was the worst.  Underlying the seemingly frivolous 
story was the serious question of whether or not the floods were getting worse.  
Newspaper accounts during the flood of 1883 also offer the most information about the 
1847 flood because the two were similar in nature and there were still some of the 
original settlers from the 1840s alive to compare the two.  Both were major floods that 
caused considerable damage, but many of the old-timers could not agree on which one 
was the worst.  The February 9, 1883 issue of the Peru Republican discussed the pros and 
cons of both arguments.  Apparently, in 1847 a mark was notched into the trunk of an 
elm tree between Canal Street and the Wabash River delineating the high-water mark for 
that flood.  During the height of the 1883 flood, “some adventurous young men took a 
lantern and searched for the old mark on the elm tree and report that it was covered with 
water.”210  However, many of the riverfront factories and businesses marked the heights 
and dates of the various floods on their walls and the 1847 faction pointed to the fact that 
many of those marks showed the 1883 flood did not measure up, so to speak.  The two 
factions had to agree to disagree, but the general consensus was that the 1883 flood was 
worse.211  There were no suggestions in any paper on what to do about it. 
 This newspaper account provides insight into the attitude of Peruvians in 1883.  
Rather than focusing on the mounting problems caused by flooding, there was an almost 
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perverse pride taken by townspeople in the level of destruction.  Townspeople treated the 
river like a naughty child whose antics could be measured by a mark on a wall or a notch 
on a tree.  Bragging rights took precedence over flood control.  Contemporary visions of 
the landscape simply did not allow the people along the river to recognize that human 
intrusion into the environment was exacerbating the problem.  What Peruvians failed to 
recognize was that no matter how much they tried to bury nature within the urban 
landscape of the town, they could only ignore their relationship with the nonhuman world 
at their own peril.  People surely noticed that the marks on the walls were climbing 
higher and occurring more often than in the “good old days” of 1847.  By turning the 
discussion into a contest over which flood was the highest, the article deflected attention 
from the fact that the floods were affecting the economy and quality of life in Peru.  
Townspeople ignored the growing flood problem even as they marked its advance on 
their walls. 
 Over the next few weeks, articles also appeared in the newspapers that 
downplayed the severity of the flood.  The economic base of the town had grown 
considerably since 1875 and it was difficult to ignore the significance of the damage, but 
the local papers tried.  On February 16, the paper denied outside reports of damage, 
claiming that no one in the county lacked fuel or food and that total flood losses for the 
county would not exceed $20,000.212  Considering the fact that Indiana Manufacturing 
alone reported $5,000 in damages, the paper seemed to be shortchanging the scope of the 
damage.  The articles also stressed the speed with which the town returned to normal.   
 The 1883 flood was undoubtedly the costliest yet to Peru and despite attempts to 
minimize the damage, follow-up articles in the Peru Republican did reveal a dawning 
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awareness by some people that the Wabash was a growing threat to the community.  In 
March of 1883, a huge ice dam formed across the river below Peru.  It caused continued 
flooding of bottom lands as water poured around either side of the river.  The County 
Council financed several attempts to blow up the dam, but the dynamite had no effect.  
“The work was reluctantly abandoned, but council in its power did everything to satisfy 
the demand of the people….”213  This is an admission in print that some in the 
community were giving voice to their concerns over the river.  
 Demand for change was not the dominant position of the time, however; denial 
was still the prevalent attitude.  A February 23 newspaper article discounted the 
sensationalistic reports made in neighboring towns about the damage caused to Peru by 
the 1883 flood.  “One report was circulated that the Dow works [north of Peru] were 
submerged and… that the water was up to the courthouse.  It will be a wet day in Peru 
when either of these things takes place.”214  This defiant quote reinforced the notion that 
people controlled the economic and environmental agenda in Peru and for a number of 
years, the newspaper was right.  No one realized that the prediction would be fulfilled 
almost thirty years later. 
 After the flood of 1883, Peru gained some breathing room from the Wabash.  
Twenty-one years passed before the next big flood hit the town.  Memories of 1883 faded 
and, once again, the idea of a major flood became easy to ignore.  Two of Peru’s richest 
men, Milton Shirk and Aaron Dukes, bought the entire stretch of the Wabash & Erie 
Canal between Huntington and Lafayette when it was sold for pennies on the dollar by 
the state during the bankruptcy sale for the defunct waterway.  They planned on selling 
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the narrow strip of land to industry and railroads, so acknowledging the vulnerability of 
their investment to the power of the river would impede sales.  They did their best to 
downplay potential problems, even taking over the most consistently flood-ravaged 
industrial site in Peru, the Indiana Manufacturing complex, down by the old feeder dam.   
 By 1900, potential environmental problems abounded around Peru.  The Wabash 
Railroad ran across the prairie north of the confluence of the Wabash and Mississinewa 
rivers while the Lake Erie & Western Railroad (later the Chesapeake & Ohio) ran from 
Indianapolis north to Peru. Both of these lines employed the elevated rail-bed of the 
Whittemore form to protect the tracks in case of a flood.  Both of these lines were raised 
after the 1883 flood showed they were inadequate.  This meant that the flood plain on 
both the north and south sides of the confluence of the Wabash and Mississinewa rivers 
was blocked by a 5-8 foot high wall (see Figure 6).  The main consequence of this action 
was the creation of a large impoundment area between the two railroads.  If the rivers 
flooded, instead of immediately flowing out to the north and south foothills of the 
Wabash Valley, the water would be stopped by the elevated rails and funneled directly 
toward the city of Peru.  If the flow from the Mississinewa River was powerful enough, it 
would, in time, overwhelm the Wabash Railroad tracks and flow north and west, hitting 
the town from that direction also.  By 1900, Peru was at the mouth of a double-barreled 
shotgun armed by the two rivers waiting to go off the next time a major flood occurred.   
 89 
 
 The people of Peru saw no threats from the continued changes to the environment, 
only progress.  Farmers rapidly put new land under the plow and more products found 
their way to market at Peru.  The city embraced the railroads with the same fervor 
originally directed at the Wabash & Erie Canal.  The railroads not only provided 
hundreds of jobs for Peruvians, they maintained the economic growth of the town by 
providing cheap transportation for the agricultural and manufactured goods produced in 
and around the rapidly industrializing town.  By 1904, the population of Peru had grown 
to over 10,500.215  The small village was on the verge of becoming a major industrial 
center.   
 If the original marriage between Peru and the canal had been one of man and 
nature, the introduction of modern industry seemed to delineate a permanent separation 
                                                          
215 Bodurtha, History of Miami County, 177. 
 90 
of the two.  Man no longer needed nature.  “The machine… was their surrogate in what 
seemed a simple opposition of the mechanical and the natural… Machines replaced 
bodies… machines overcame nature.”216  It was true.  Steam powered tractors and 
threshers increased agricultural output.  Locomotives pulled loads 365 days a year.  
Water power was a thing of the past by 1904; new sources of energy eliminated the need 
for it.  The new spatial structure of the town reduced the role of the Wabash River in the 
economic development of the town.  The site of the old feeder dam was now the site of 
the town’s new coal-fired electric plant.  Discovery of oil and natural gas under the city 
in 1897 led to a frenzied expansion of industry as many new factories moved into Peru to 
exploit cheap sources of power and transportation.  Industry was free from water power; 
the river was useful only as a tool to remove human and industrial effluent.  Lack of 
major flooding helped fuel this expansion.   
 Peru grew exponentially with the technological advances of the late 1800’s, 
meaning that the stakes were larger because the next big flood hit a much larger town.  
From the very beginning, the history of the Peru was atypical of the belief that what was 
manmade was separate from what was natural.  Peru, however, depended on the Wabash 
River for success.  The Wabash & Erie Canal channeled the power of the river both 
literally and imaginatively to create a transportation system that utilized nature.  It was a 
relationship destined to collapse under the weight of the technological advances that soon 
replaced the canal with the railroads, a transportation system that didn’t need the river.  
The more control that humans applied to the landscape around them, the more they 
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believed that nature was becoming subservient to their power.  In reality, each perceived 
success served only to bind the community more tightly to the natural landscape.   
 After the flood of 1883, the Wabash River remained relatively quiet for over two 
decades, giving the town a respite from major flooding and making it easier for the 
townspeople to cling to the mistaken notion that the Wabash was under human control.  
Lulled by a false sense of security, Peruvians continued to build homes and businesses in 
areas vulnerable to a major flood.  Then, in January of 1904, the river passed flood stage 
once again, inundating the town.  Heavy rains caused a rapid rise in the river, but the 
flood fell short of the 1883 level.  South Peru, which had grown in size between 1883 and 
1904, was pummeled by high water.  The flood came and went quickly, causing harm all 
over the state, but sparing Peru the worst of the damage.  Then, in April of 1904, the river 
did something unprecedented; it flooded a second time in the same year.  The water level 
this time missed the 1883 mark by less than a foot.  Heavy damage again occurred in 
South Peru and in the eastern part of Peru.  Indiana Manufacturing suffered great damage 
“with water up to the doorknobs in the buildings” and other factories once more losing 
thousands of board feet of lumber to the river. 217    
 Newspaper accounts from this flood reflect a major change in attitude about the 
place of the river within the local landscape.  This change was due in no small part to the 
fact that by 1904, Peru had developed a much larger economic base, meaning there was 
much more to lose.  This time the Peru Republican explained that the overflow occurred 
after “The Steady Downpour of Last Friday” and announced “Thousands of Dollars in 
loss Caused by the Water”; it also acknowledged the suffering of Peru’s citizens.218  It 
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was a far cry from the description given to previous floods.  There were no light-hearted 
stories or references to the forces of nature or acts of God, only a recitation of the losses 
and failed attempts to divert the water away from South Peru.  The paper made no 
attempt to put a happy face on events.  This marks an important shift in the way people 
interpreted the relationship between the town and the river.  A flood was no longer an act 
of God; it was an unwanted intrusion by nature.  Even more importantly, it was an 
unrestrained force that was out of place in an environment that humans supposedly 
controlled.  Humans needed to find a way to re-establish their dominance in the 
landscape.  
 The April, 1904 flood was so severe that the water from the Mississinewa pushed 
across the Wabash, over the railroad, and up to the foothills in the north, pummeling Peru 
from that direction as well as from the Wabash.  The April 2nd edition of the Peru Daily 
Chronicle broached the idea that the town’s troubles originated with the overflow of the 
Mississinewa River, not the Wabash.219  On April 4th, the Daily Chronicle estimated total 
losses at $50,000, with damage concentrated in the eastern and southern parts of town, a   
pattern of flood damage that remained consistent over the years, with the eastern portion 
of town most vulnerable because of its proximity to the fork of the Wabash and 
Mississinewa rivers.220  As Peru grew in size, the town spread north and west away from 
the river, but much of the new urban growth was concentrated in a new suburb called 
Oakdale, less than one-half mile north of the old feeder dam; an area still prone to 
flooding when the Mississinewa pushed north (see Figure 7).  The floodwater from the 
1904 floods was slow to retreat from this district, an unintended consequence of some of 
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the drainage infrastructure.  
 
As a consequence, there was finger pointing about causes of the flood and arguments 
among city councilmen about who was responsible “for taking the suburb into the city 
and then refusing to even consider the question of a remedy for the high water.”221   
 The incumbent political and economic leaders of Peru were tasked with solving a 
difficult problem.  Water had long ceased to be the driving force for the economy of the 
town, but the Wabash River remained.  This led to a quandary for town fathers, because 
despite the destruction caused by floods, Peru continued to grow, making each flood 
more costly than the last.  Factories clung tenaciously to the vicinity of the old canal 
feeder dam even though every flood caused severe damage to machinery and inventory.  
Indiana Manufacturing Company and the Peru Casting Plant were good examples of the 
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refusal of industry to move to a safer location.  Both of these businesses added massive 
complexes along the river after the flood of 1883 and suffered accordingly in 1904.222  
Apparently, the cost of moving was still more than the cost of repairing flood damage 
because everyone stayed put.  Once again, flood stories in the local papers quickly 
disappeared.  There were still no easy solutions to the predicament, so the town fathers 
did what politicians often do when faced with a difficult problem -- they ignored it.  For 
the next three years, the local newspapers remained mute on the subject of flood control. 
 Yet another flood in January of 1907 resurrected the problem of the river.  The 
Peru Daily Chronicle recounted the traditional litany of damages.223  The Miami County 
Sentinel put no dollar amount to the damages, simply saying it would take “thousands 
upon thousands of dollars to replace the loss occasioned by the flood” and commenting 
that most people remembered the lessons of 1904 and were better prepared for the current 
deluge.224  Indeed, most people seemed to deal with the river by making an 
accommodation to the flood.  Much of the populace moved carpet and furniture to the 
second floors of their homes when it became obvious a flood was imminent, but virtually 
no one evacuated.  While they did not have the power to keep the water out, they refused 
to surrender to the river.  They rode the flood out in the upper stories of their houses and 
while there were a few close calls, no one died.  
  This behavior seemed to be a reaffirmation of the pioneer acceptance of the 
floods as a part of the natural landscape.  There was no movement in the community to 
change the status quo.  None of the local papers addressed the economic cost of the flood 
to the community, but one Indianapolis paper listed 2,000 men unemployed, ten factories 
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closed, and damages in excess of $20,000 just during the first day of the flood.225  Once 
again, within a week of the flood, the Peru papers stopped making any references to it.  
There is no detailed list of damage, no guidance on cleanup, nor any editorial comment 
about the need to develop some type of flood control.  No city council meetings 
addressed the problem.  Outside of the use of the factory whistle at Indiana 
Manufacturing as a warning of imminent danger, there was no organized preparation for 
the flood.  After three major floods in three years, the tactic of ignoring the river once 
again seemed to be a poor strategy, but it is the path the political and economic leaders 
chose to take.   
 No one understood that Peru’s economic development was altering the river and 
its behavior.  That is why industry continued to expand and people continued to build 
houses in places that now seem absurd.  Environmental historians recognize that “When 
you use and change a landscape, the place will respond.  Nature is never passive.”226  
However, they have the benefit of hindsight, something the people of Peru lacked.  The 
Wabash River and Peru were originally bound together by the canal.  That connection 
built the town and made it successful, but as the town grew and technology changed, the 
relationship between the Wabash River and the town of Peru became more complicated.  
By the time Peruvians began to understand just how intertwined their lives were with the 
river, it was too late to avoid a major disaster.   
 After 1907, the people of Peru assumed they had seen the worst floods that the 
Wabash River had to offer, but in March of 1913, events took place that altered 
perceptions about the relationship between the town and river forever.  Economic growth 
                                                          
225 Indianapolis News, January 19, 1907. 
226 William Deverell and Greg Hise, eds., Land of Sunshine: An Environmental History of Metropolitan Los 
Angeles (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 224. 
 96 
had continued after the 1907 flood.  By 1913, the town boasted a population of almost 
13,000 citizens as well as a growing industrial base.227  The industrial center of the town 
continued to shift northward away from the river into Oakdale.  Other than an attempt to 
lessen flooding in South Peru by raising Riverside Drive about three feet to create a dike, 
the city had done nothing since 1907 to alleviate ongoing problems caused by the river.  
Some of the residents of South Peru also raised their homes two or three feet in the hope 
that they could avoid future flood damage, but those were individual actions, not because 
of city planning.  
 For the most part, there was no organized effort to deal with the flood problem, 
with one exception.  Peru’s largest factory was still the Indiana Manufacturing Company, 
the only major industry other than the railroad that remained along the river.  The 
manager of the company, Elbert W. Shirk, knew that the raised railroad embankment to 
the southeast of the factory magnified flood problems for his factory and the town.  For 
years he tried to get the city to address the problems caused by the river, but city leaders 
ignored his advice.228  On Saturday, March 22, 1913, Shirk’s fears became a reality and 
the people of Peru learned a grim lesson about the power of the Wabash River.  
 The 1913 flood was unlike any other flood in the history of Peru.  The ground 
around Peru was soaked from previous storms and the river was already high as the 
Easter weekend rain began on the 22nd.  Over the next five days, almost eight inches of 
rain and snow fell on the water-soaked Upper Wabash Valley, overwhelming the capacity 
of the ground to absorb any further moisture.229  The massive amount of drainage tile did 
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its job and funneled hundreds of millions of gallons of water into the swollen Wabash 
River.  Water data from the United States Geologic Service states that the normal amount 
of stream flow for the Wabash River at Peru in 1913 was around 10,000 cubic feet per 
second (CFS).  The major floods experienced in the town before 1913 averaged 20-
30,000 CFS.  The 1913 flood dwarfed any numbers, peaking at a staggering 118,000 
CFS, almost seven times worse than any previous flood.230  Decades of deforestation, 
ditching, tiling, and other destabilizing ecological practices contributed to what has been 
described as a 500 year event.231  The environmental shotgun that was aimed at the city 
of Peru went off with a big bang. 
 The weather in Peru turned bad on Good Friday with high winds, rain and snow 
mixing at times.  Many churches cancelled Easter services on Sunday because of 
torrential rains and by Monday morning, Peruvians realized that the river was going to 
overflow its banks.  Elbert Shirk, the manager of Indiana Manufacturing, had eyed the 
river nervously for years and knew the complex was vulnerable to flooding.  He tried to 
divert the water away from the 1.5 million board feet of lumber stacked alongside the 
factory by organizing his factory workers into a makeshift dam building crew.  They built 
a temporary wall across Canal Street in an attempt to protect the factory.  They succeeded 
in stopping seven feet of water from pushing through, but by Monday afternoon Shirk 
saw that water would soon overwhelm the dike and ordered it abandoned.232   
 Shirk’s experience reveals the scale of the 1913 flood.  Indiana Manufacturing 
had been flooded numerous times in the past, but the company always overcame the 
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financial losses.  This time was different.  Shirk, a Harvard educated businessman who 
understood the potential danger of a flood and tried to prepare for it, was completely 
overwhelmed by the scale of the catastrophe.  He spent the wee hours of the morning 
standing in icy cold water trying to save valuable papers inside his office.  By the time he 
gave up, the water was almost up to his shoulders.  By late Monday night, the rising 
water swept his factory from end to end, washing away the lumber.233  Much of the 
lumber that washed away from the factory snagged on the trusses of the new cement 
bridge just a short distance downstream from the plant.  This had the effect of creating a 
massive dam across the Wabash and diverted even more water directly into the streets of 
Peru.  In one last attempt to save the business, Shirk, at great risk to his life, spent much 
of Thursday trying to fasten some of the great piles of lumber together in order to save 
them.  Despite his efforts, most of the lumber was ruined, swept downstream, or pilfered 
by locals to use in rebuilding after the flood was over.234  Legend has it that quite a few 
houses were repaired after the flood using lumber scavenged from along the banks of the 
Wabash.  Shirk's losses amounted to about $250,000, a huge sum by 1913 standards.235  
Indiana Manufacturing could not absorb the loss and finally went out of business, ending 
the industrial presence along the old canal once and for all. 
 Monday afternoon, while Shirk and his men were waging their battle on Canal 
Street, people close to the river took the normal course of action, pulling up carpet and 
moving furniture to the second stories of their houses.  There was no panic or undue 
concern over the situation, especially by the people who lived on the high side of town 
north of the river.  It was rare for water to be more than a nuisance there.  South Peru was 
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another matter.  Despite the recent elevation of Riverside Drive, the land south of the city 
was still vulnerable to flooding along the low-lying streets.  By Monday afternoon, storm 
sewers in the streets south of the river were spewing water.  Unlike some of the bigger 
cities affected by the 1913 flood, such as Dayton, Ohio, there was no kind of warning 
system in place to broadcast the severity of the flood, nor was there an organized plan to 
warn people of the danger.236  Consequently, most people anticipated a typical flood, one 
that brought two or three feet of water down the streets, resulting in a few hours of 
isolation in their houses.  Few people contemplated evacuation.237   
 No one expected the rapid rise of the river that occurred because no previous 
flood ever hit so quickly.  Early reports from towns upriver indicated a flood similar to 
those in the past, but by six o'clock in the evening, the floodwaters exploded over the 
riverbank east of town and began flowing into the low areas of South Peru.  In less than 
an hour, the water was knee high and many people decided to head for the hills south of 
town, while others complacently made the decision to ride out the flood in their homes.  
As a windy, bitterly cold night fell, more and more citizens of South Peru decided to head 
for high ground, but the rising water and the fast moving current soon ended the 
evacuation efforts.238 
 There was unease on the north side of the Wabash also.  Grocery stores did a 
brisk business as people stocked up on food, candles, and other necessities.  At eight 
o'clock in the evening, the town fire whistle began to shriek.  Omer Holman explained the 
reason for the warning: 
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 …as it sounded longer and louder than usual, I went to Broadway to 
ascertain the location of the fire.  I soon learned that the whistle was the 
signal that the city water was to be turned off as there was danger of the 
river getting into the water works station real soon.  I hurried home and 
filled every empty vessel in the house with water.  I did not neglect filling 
the tub, either.239 
 
Earlier on Monday, The Peru Evening Journal rushed an issue to press warning of a 
possible flood, but with only a mention that it might be comparable to 1907.240  Hundreds 
of curiosity seekers lined the banks of the Wabash at the foot of Broadway to watch the 
water creep higher.  While Elbert Shirk was frantically trying to divert the flood away 
from his furniture factory, many of the town's citizens, oblivious to the danger, flocked to 
South Broadway to gawk.  Complacency dissolved by Monday afternoon as the river 
began to rise at the alarming rate of eight to twelve inches an hour.  Those who lived near 
the river braced for the flood, but many people on the north side of the river had no idea 
how fast the water was rising.  Until the fire siren went off at eight P.M., most of them 
believed there was no extraordinary reason for concern. 
 One man alarmed by the situation was Colonel Ben Wallace, owner of the circus 
that was in winter quarters just east of town.  He was not prepared for a flood.  There 
were hundreds of exotic animals in danger at his farm, which was already flooding.  The 
circus had many big cats, elephants, hippos, and polar bears at the farm, not to mention 
hundreds of head of livestock and other animals.  Because the farm was less than a mile 
above the confluence of the Wabash and Mississinewa rivers, it was one of the first 
places cut off, and Wallace, who was at his home in Peru, was unable to get there (see 
Figure 8).   
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When a reporter from the Peru Republican asked Wallace if there was any news, he 
answered, “I would not be surprised to learn that the whole show property is washed into 
the Mississinewa River, and that the seventy five men, as well as all my animals and 
horses, are dead.”241  His concerns were valid.  The loss to the circus was horrendous.  
Besides the death of many valuable animals, including four elephants and all of the big 
cats, most of the tents, circus wagons, train cars, and other equipment needed to run the 
show suffered damage.  The loss to Wallace amounted to over $150,000.  He could not 
absorb such a huge loss and sold the circus four months later.242 
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 Things were dangerous north of the river also.  The ground sloped gently upward 
the farther away one got from the river, but by Tuesday morning, water levels along both 
Canal and Second streets reached ten feet in places.  Part of the reason for this was the 
giant logjam at the concrete bridge on Wayne Street.243  As the lumber from the Peru 
Manufacturing Company floated downstream Monday night and wedged against the 
bridge, the floodwater surged around the obstruction and into the streets of Peru.  By 
Tuesday afternoon, pummeled by the current and debris, the Broadway Bridge washed 
away.  Many people headed for the taller buildings downtown or for higher ground at the 
east end of town.  Hundreds of people ended up marooned on a rise that came to be 
known as Smith's Island.  There was so little shelter there that over one hundred people 
were forced to cram into one small, five room house.  They packed the place so 
completely that there was no room for anyone to sit down.  They stood the entire night.  
Men in boats braved the dangers of the current and floating debris to pluck people from 
windows, trees, and roofs.  All over town, people scrambled to gather family members, 
move furniture and carpeting upstairs, and provide for the safety of livestock.  There were 
many instances of cows and horses being brought onto porches or even into houses in 
order to get them out of the weather and give them a chance to survive.  Some of the 
livestock served a more immediate purpose.  “The first night, we saw our chicken in the 
coop was going to drown, so Clevinger waded out and got it… we had stewed hen 
Tuesday evening for supper.”244  Untold numbers of animals drowned or died from 
exposure. 
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 The newspaper accounts of the 1913 flood were far different than any previous 
flood.  No longer would anyone would put marks on walls to remember what happened.  
The balance sheet now was marked by the human toll.  Delight Shields was a seventeen-
year-old young woman who worked as a secretary in Peru.  She lived in South Peru, 
along with her mother.  They were unable to escape the flood before the rising water 
made impossible to walk out.  During the attempt to rescue them, the raft on which they 
rode was caught by the current and slammed into the porch of a home on Franklin Street, 
dashing it to pieces.  Everyone but Delight was able to grab onto something solid, but she 
vanished in the swiftly moving water.  Her body was found a week later over two miles 
downstream from the accident scene.  One man drowned at the northern edge of town, 
and two other railroad workers drowned when the current pulled their boat out from 
under them as they tried to run a wire across the Wabash so boats could be ferried from 
one side to the other.  The bodies of a man named Gintner and his daughter were found in 
the old canal bed not far from the concrete bridge and another was found sitting on an 
overturned china cabinet in one of the houses.245   
 On the south side of the river, the rescuers concentrated on getting people to the 
ridge that ran along the edge of town.  The flood victims were transferred by wagon to 
rural homes for refuge, or by rail to towns like Amboy and Converse where food and 
shelter were provided by the local citizenry.  The rescue work was dangerous because the 
area was lower than the river and in many places the water was fifteen to twenty feet 
deep.  In addition, wreckage floating downstream hindered the effort.246  All day 
Tuesday, men like Roma B. Mays paddled through the rain and snow that was still 
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falling, pulling people through second story windows, plucking them from rooftops, and 
nosing into treetops so half-frozen survivors could jump into the dubious safety of the 
small boats.  One South Peru woman wrote of that Tuesday, “it was so distressing.  We 
could hear people calling for help and all night long they kept it up.  Cloe [sic] and I kept 
watch that night and we could just hear so many voices calling for help.”247  Officials 
later estimated that Mays brought over two hundred people to safety.248  At some point, 
late in the day on Tuesday, he was bringing another group of people to safety when his 
luck ran out.  One of the passengers in the boat panicked, throwing everyone into the 
water.  Mays might have saved himself, but he tried to help the woman who had upset the 
boat, and both drowned.  Townspeople later hailed him as one of the biggest heroes of the 
flood.249 
 Never before had the river caused such chaos.  Peru had never experienced flood-
related deaths before and it was a miracle that only eleven people drowned during the 
1913 flood.  The final death toll was higher because of the people who later succumbed 
to flood-related sickness.  Over the weeks immediately following the flood, a significant 
number of obituaries in the Peru papers referred to exposure as a contributing factor of 
death.  Many of these people were elderly, so it is impossible to determine to what extent 
their death was directly attributable to the flood, but it would be fair to say that the final 
death toll from the disaster was between twenty and twenty-five.  
 The consequences for Peru were immediate and long-lasting.  Owners abandoned 
many of the damaged or destroyed buildings along the waterfront.  The seven acre 
Indiana Manufacturing complex never recovered.  Elbert Shirk moved the business to 
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Richmond, Indiana, taking away 500 jobs.  Industrial growth stagnated; no other major 
manufacturer built in Peru until after the end of World War II.  The population of the 
town never again exceeded that of 1913.  The damage to the infrastructure of Peru was 
massive.  South Peru was shattered.  Only a handful of houses survived.  One third of the 
homes in the rest of Peru were ruined and another third suffered damage.250  Two of the 
town’s three bridges were swept away and every business within three blocks of the river 
suffered large losses.  Some of them never reopened.  Many of the factories in Oakdale 
also were also damaged.  Material losses to Peru amounted to a staggering $2,000,000 in 
1913 dollars.251  That number does not include lost production or the cost to the 
community of the permanent closure of factories and businesses.  The scale of the 
disaster dwarfed anything that had ever happened before, making the traditional response 
to flooding irrelevant.  Ignoring the problem was no longer an option.  In one fell swoop, 
the disaster exposed decades of misunderstanding and denial about the power and place 
of the river in the life of the town.    
 The traditional view of nature separated humans from the environment, but the 
flood revealed just how thin the line was.  The damage forced the citizens of Peru to 
reevaluate the question of where the river fit within the landscape, reminding them that 
the river was still the center of the landscape.  While the need for water power had 
diminished over the years, the Wabash still dominated the economic fortunes of the town, 
making it impossible to ignore.  Peruvians had looked beyond water for their economic 
future, while remaining oblivious to the fact that the very progress they sought altered the 
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river, making them increasingly vulnerable to the increasingly unstable Wabash.  It was 
one thing to abandon the canal; abandoning the river was not so easy.  
 Local industrial and governmental leaders realized they could no longer afford to 
dismiss the power of the river.  They asked questions echoed years later by 
environmental historian Marc Reisner: “Where do we place ourselves in nature?  Are we 
the masters of the environment or merely players within it?”252  Peruvians reacted to their 
epiphany by pressing for literal control of the landscape in the form of dams.  One civic 
leader declared that without the dams, “Peru cannot hope to attract major industries, to 
see fine homes erected, or to draw to this center wealth which is essential to our cities’ 
prosperity.”253  It was a far cry from the days when the Peru paper bragged that the city 
could, if necessary, “ live perfectly independent of the rest of the world, were we 
surrounded by a Chinese wall.”254  The boast about surrounding Peru with a wall had 
changed to a plea for help.  The line between what was human and what was natural was 
blurred by the 1913 flood.  Peru needed a way to refocus it and what clearer line was 
there than a dam?   
 Up until 1913, any effort to address flooding was done at the local level, but soon 
after the flood, Indiana established four regional flood districts to tackle the problem.  
One of those districts was in Peru.255  The move marked a dramatic shift as state and 
federal entities assumed the bulk of responsibility for flood control.  This was both good 
and bad for Peru.  It was good because it brought new engineering resources into the 
discussion and planning, but it was bad because the state and federal government did not 
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always pay for the plans they formulated.  Even worse, federal involvement with its 
accompanying red tape slowed action to a crawl.  The residents of Peru got their first 
dose of this new reality soon after the 1913 flood ended.  The town’s main bridge across 
the Wabash River washed out during the flood.  While making plans to replace it quickly, 
local planners were shocked when they learned that in the interest of national security, 
Congress and the War Department had to approve of any new structure.256  Although the 
bridge could have been replaced within three or four months, it took eight months before 
federal approval was gained when Congress passed H.R. 8702, the bill authorizing the 
city of Peru to “construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto across 
the Wabash River.”257  The legislation provided no funding for the project.  Construction 
of the new bridge did not begin until almost a year after the flood.  The federal 
government was quick to assume control of the problem, but slow to finance a solution.  
It was a portent of things to come.   
 The consensus of expert opinion after March of 1913 was that future protection 
along the Wabash River depended not only on dams and levees, but also on reforestation, 
an acknowledgment that human manipulation of the landscape played a role in the 
flooding.258  The Army Corps of Engineers visited Peru in May of 1913 to study the river 
and formulate a flood prevention plan.259  The group of engineers decided the answer to 
Peru’s dilemma was a levee.  The plan called for raising the height of all bridges, 
dredging the river to remove obstructions, clearing the riverbank of all trees and brush, 
and the construction of a twelve foot high earthen wall along the north side of the 
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Wabash River that would extend from one end of town to the other.260  Engineers 
considered this a stop-gap measure until they could conduct thorough surveys along the 
Upper Wabash Valley and formulate permanent flood control plans.261  The plan was 
expensive and received with little enthusiasm by city leaders, who preferred the building 
of a dam on the Wabash.  They wanted to control the water on a larger scale.  Only part 
of the levee was ever built and it had little impact on flood prevention.  
 Business and political leaders in Peru believed that a dam was the best solution to 
their problem.  The 1913 flood was the catalyst for Peru as well as other towns along the 
Wabash to organize and make long-term plans for flood control.  These efforts began 
soon after the 1913 flood when a delegation of civic leaders from Peru appeared before 
the Indiana Railroad Commission to make the argument that the severity of the flood was 
magnified by the elevated grade of the railroad that ran along the river.262  This was the 
first official acknowledgment by Peruvians that human interference in the environment 
played a significant role in the flooding of the town.  Over the next thirty years, as the 
semi-annual floods continued, state and federal officials commiserated with the cities 
along the Upper Wabash, but made little progress in solving the problem.    
 There was not another catastrophic flood until 1943.  It marked a regional shift in 
thinking about the landscape.  The city governments of every town along the Upper 
Wabash Valley from Huntington to Delphi acknowledged the changing perception of life 
along the river when they met to form a flood prevention association which would lobby 
the federal government for financial aid.263  The effort to establish a flood control district 
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along the Wabash River did not gain any momentum until after the end of WWII, but by 
1958, the federal government finally approved almost $50,000,000 for a series of three 
dams along the Wabash and its tributaries.264  One dam would be built on the Wabash 
River at Huntington, one on the Salamonie River at Wabash, and one on the 
Mississinewa River at Peru (see Figure 9).   
 
 On April 27, 1962, exactly forty-nine years and one month after the peak of the 
1913 flood, the Army Corps of Engineers broke ground on the Mississinewa dam project.  
By 1967, it was completed, marking an end to the three dam project and ushering in a 
new vision of human protection and control along the upper Wabash Valley.265  
Protection, however, does not necessarily equal control.  The last flood to hit Peru was in 
1959.  Since then, the river has been relatively quiet because of the dams, but not 
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inactive.  In 1999, the Army Corps of Engineers realized that the Mississinewa dam, an 
earthen structure, seemed to be shifting.  Testing revealed that water had infiltrated the 
base of the structure and found its way through to the other side.266  It took 40 years, but 
the Mississinewa River had found a way to overcome human technology and reassert 
itself within the landscape.  Engineers had to drain most of the water out of the reservoir, 
drill down to bedrock, and install a wall within one side of the dam to stop further 
erosion.  The repairs began in January of 2002, lasted until the spring of 2005, and cost 
$55,000,000.267  The relationship between humans and the rivers of the Upper Wabash 
Valley has not yet ended.   
 The misperception of the human place within the natural landscape is the catalyst 
for much of the history surrounding the town of Peru.  Looking at that history from an 
environmental perspective offers a new layer in the areas historical record.  Humans 
introduced both themselves and their technology into the local landscape with the 
mistaken assumption that they could control and manipulate both the land and water of 
the region for their economic benefit.  Nowhere was the effect of this miscalculation 
more evident than in the increasingly erratic behavior of the Wabash River at Peru.  As a 
result of the environmental changes brought about by people, the economic advantages 
offered by the location of Peru slowly disappeared under the steady assault of the Wabash 
River.  The power of water was the reason Peru was built and also the reason why Peru 
saw its economic fortunes decline.  
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Conclusion 
 The connection between Peru and the Wabash River is a tangled landscape 
created through the interaction of humans and nature.  The first humans to live and work 
along the river left a small environmental footprint, living in harmony with the landscape.  
It was not until the introduction of American settlers to the region that the relationship 
changed.  Men like Joseph Holman and William Hood believed they could change the 
environment of the Upper Wabash Valley to fit their own economic and cultural vision.  
The relationship that developed created a new landscape, one in which humans sought 
control over the most powerful natural feature in northern Indiana, the Wabash River.  
Starting with the construction of the Wabash & Erie Canal, people spent the next eighty 
years building, digging, and draining along the river, while failing to see that interaction 
with the environment was changing the behavior of the river.  It was not until the Wabash 
River destroyed much of Peru that people began to question their place within the 
landscape of the Upper Wabash Valley.    
 There are often unexpected consequences when humans attempt to alter nature. 
Mark Fiege’s book Irrigated Eden argues that no matter what we do to nature, it always 
responds.  No matter how dominant human technology seems to be, nature always fights 
back.  Irrigated Eden uses the irrigation system of southern Idaho and the Snake River to 
show how manmade “improvements” to natural environments form landscapes that are a 
little bit of both.  Lateral L, a manmade irrigation ditch that had natural elements 
incorporated into it, looked and acted like a natural creek although it wasn’t.268  The line 
between manmade and natural was blurred to the point that it was no longer relevant.  
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Fiege contends that no matter how hard people try to change the landscape, nature has a 
way of altering the new environment, often in ways that make it even stronger than 
before.269  Moss infiltrated irrigation ditches, an abundance of new vegetation led to 
rabbit infestations, and water seepage poisoned the land with salt.  For every move the 
hydraulic engineers made, nature answered, leading Fiege to say that “the boundary 
between what the irrigators considered artificial and natural, domesticated and wild, grew 
hazy, indistinct, and sometimes disappeared altogether.”270   
 The same process occurred along the Wabash River around Peru.  Misconceptions 
about the role of humans in the natural landscape led to decisions that defined the history 
of the town and the region around it.  The Wabash & Erie Canal is a prime example of 
Fiege’s argument.  It brought both economic growth and environmental chaos to the area.  
The decision to build Peru in a vulnerable location so close to the fork of the Wabash and 
Mississinewa rivers was based solely on economic advantages created by the canal.  The 
canal brought thousands of settlers to Miami County.  They introduced manmade 
improvements that altered the natural environment in various ways, creating a new 
landscape in the process.  The new agricultural economy around Peru as well as the 
industrial economy within the town depended on the assumption that human technology 
was superior to the power of nature.  They did not understand the ability of nature to fight 
back. The operation of the canal proved to be more complicated and expensive than 
anticipated.  Banks collapsed, weeds clogged the water, and weather damaged locks and 
viaducts.  For every move people made to overcome natural obstacles, the landscape 
adapted.    
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 Man dug, drained, and elevated the landscape around Peru in an effort to gain the 
upper hand over nature, but technology did not always equal control; it often led to 
unpredictable consequences when nature pushed back.  The ultimate reaction to the 
changes humans brought to the landscape was flooding.  The history of Peru shows an 
escalating pattern of environmental interaction between humans and the river.  The more 
people tampered with the land, the more severe the flooding became.  The idea of 
Manifest Destiny promoted the idea that man was separated from nature by technology, 
when in fact, the line along the Wabash River was being blurred by human interaction.  It 
wasn’t until the Wabash River erased the line completely in 1913 that the residents of 
Peru realized how intertwined they were with the river.  What was natural had combined 
with what was manmade to create something Peruvians needed but could not control.  
They spent nearly another century seeking ways to regain control over their environment.  
The solution they arrived at was to dam the river that defied them.  As of 2009, the battle 
seems to have swung in their favor, but as the repairs to the Mississinewa dam show, 
nature is patient and relentless in its work.  
 Environmental history writers have developed the idea that nature is inseparable 
from humanity.  Historians have looked at the theme of water and nature in particular to 
show how the relationship between people and rivers intertwine.  Environmental history 
has evolved from the assumption that nature is an expansive, pristine place disconnected 
from humanity to the notion that it is a partner and integral to our environmental 
landscape.  Rivers play a large part in that progression of historical thought.  William 
Cronon has said that we need to find some kind of middle ground in which a common 
definition applies to the landscape that enfolds us.  He uses the term “home” because it is 
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“the place we try to sustain so we can pass along what is best in it (and ourselves) to our 
children.”271  The historical lesson that rivers teach is that home is a landscape created by 
a combination of what is manmade with what is natural.  On that day so long ago when I 
stood on my kitchen stoop and watched the water from the Wabash River lap at the 
foundation of our home, I made the same mistake that so many people make about the 
landscape in which we live.  I thought the town and the river were separate things.  The 
reality was that the riverfront wasn’t necessarily a dumb place to put a house; it was a 
natural place to build because of the strong connection between people and their 
environment.  The Wabash River and the people of Peru are knotted in a relationship that 
extends back as far as the presence of people in what is known now as Miami County.  
When it comes to understanding home, the Wabash still has lessons to impart in Nature’s 
School.  
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